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Abstract 
National policies take varied approaches to encouraging university-based innovation.  This paper 
studies a natural experiment:  the end of the “professor’s privilege” in Norway, where university 
researchers previously enjoyed full rights to their innovations.  Upon the reform, Norway moved 
toward the typical U.S. model, where the university holds majority rights.  Using comprehensive 
data on Norwegian workers, firms, and patents, we find a 50% decline in both entrepreneurship 
and patenting rates by university researchers after the reform.  Quality measures for university 
start-ups and patents also decline.  Applications to literatures on university technology transfer, 
innovation incentives, and taxes and entrepreneurship are considered. 
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I. Introduction 
University researchers can create valuable commercial innovations.  Standing at the frontier of 
knowledge, university researchers may start successful high-technology companies (e.g., 
Genentech and Google) and create valuable intellectual property (e.g., the Hepatitis B vaccine 
and the pain medication Lyrica).1  Given these roles, university patenting and entrepreneurship 
have become subjects of substantial public interest and an expansive research literature, as 
reviewed below. 
This paper studies a large shock to university innovation policy.  The setting is Norway, which in 
2003 ended the “professor’s privilege,” by which university researchers had previously enjoyed 
full rights to new business ventures and intellectual property they created.   The new policy 
transferred two-thirds of these rights to the universities themselves, creating a policy regime like 
that which typically prevails in the United States and many other countries today.  In addition to 
the policy experiment, Norway also provides unusual data opportunities.  Registry data allows us 
to identify all start-ups in the economy, including those founded by university researchers.  We 
can also link university researchers to their patents.  We are thus able to study the reform’s 
effects on both new venture and patenting channels. 
Inspired partly by a belief that U.S. universities are more successful at commercial innovation 
(Mowery and Sampat 2005, Lissoni et al. 2008), many European countries have enacted laws in 
the last 15 years that substantially altered the rights to university-based innovations.  In 
Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, new laws ended the so-called “professor’s 
privilege”.  Recognizing potential complementarities between institution-level and researcher-
level investments, the new laws sought to enhance university incentives to support 
commercialization activity, including through the establishment of technology transfer offices 
(TTOs).  However, while these reforms may have encouraged university-level investment, they 
also sharply increased the effective tax rate on university-based innovators, leaving the effect of 
                                                           
1
 For example, University of California San Francisco Professor Herbert Boyer founded Genentech to bring genetic 
engineering into the marketplace, and Stanford graduate students Sergey Brin and Larry Page founded Google and 
revolutionized Internet search.  In the patenting sphere, University of California researchers produced the Hepatitis 
B vaccine, and Northwestern University Professor Richard Silverman created the compound for a pain medication, 
Lyrica, which was Pfizer’s top-selling drug in 2014, with global sales of $5 billion.  U.S. universities and research 
institutions were granted over 6,000 patents and executed over 5,000 licenses in fiscal year 2012, according to a 
recent survey (AUTM 2015). 
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such reforms theoretically ambiguous.  Broadly, these national systems moved from an 
environment where university researchers had full property rights to a system that looks much 
like the U.S. system today (since the 1980 U.S. Bayh-Dole Act), where the innovator typically 
holds a minority of the rights (often one-third) and the university holds the remainder (Jensen 
and Thursby 2001, Lach and Schankerman 2008). 
To study the end of the professor’s privilege, we leverage several datasets that allow us to 
examine new venture and patenting activity for all university researchers in Norway.  Registry 
datasets provide detailed information about all Norwegian workers and firms, while also linking 
specific individuals to specific firms.  We are thus able to identify all new firms in Norway and 
all new firms started by university employees.  The data further provides far-reaching 
information about all Norwegian adults, including educational attainment, degree type, age, 
income, wealth, and family status, allowing us to compare the behavior of those directly affected 
by the policy shock (i.e., university employees) with various control samples (e.g., all Norwegian 
individuals, and various subsets with increasingly similar demographic characteristics to the 
university employees).  We separately collect all patents issued in Norway and compare 
patenting by university-based researchers with other Norwegian inventors.  Finally, we 
integrated all publications in the Web of Science by Norway-based researchers to examine 
publication outcomes. 
Our primary empirical finding is that the shift in rights from researcher to university led to an 
approximate 50% drop in the rate of start-ups by university researchers.  This drop appears (1) in 
a simple pre-post analysis of university start-up rates, (2) when compared to background rates of 
start-ups in Norway, and (3) when analyzed at the level of the individual Norwegian citizen, 
controlling for fixed and time-varying individual-level characteristics.  We further find that 
university researchers substantially curtailed their patenting after the reform, with patent rates 
falling by similar magnitudes as seen with start-ups.  In addition to these effects on the quantity 
of innovative output, we find evidence for decreased quality of both start-ups and patents, where 
university start-ups exhibit less growth and university patents receive fewer citations after the 
reform, compared to controls.  Overall, the reform appeared to have the opposite effect as 
intended.   
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Primarily, this study informs the literature on university commercialization policy.  The end of 
the professor’s privilege constitutes a major policy shift that was enacted in Norway and 
mirrored in several other European countries.  The study thus informs the policy’s effects in 
Norway, with potential additional applications to similar reforms and ex-post policy regimes 
more generally.  Notably, the post-reform regime is similar to policies that prevail in the U.S. 
today, among many other countries.  The central finding is that the policy change in Norway 
effectively halved measured rates of innovation. 
The analysis may also provide insight for other literatures.  Noting that the experiment sharply 
changed the allocation of rights between researchers and the university, the findings can inform 
the role of rights allocations in knowledge production.  How to balance the allocation of rights 
between investing parties is a classic question in economics that also features in canonical 
theories of innovation (Holmstrom 1982, Grossman and Hart 1986, Aghion and Tirole 1994, 
Green and Scotchmer 1995, Hellmann 2007).  The natural experiment in this paper can be seen 
as supporting the idea that innovation rights matter, even in universities, where the norms of 
science might otherwise suggest greater willingness to put output in the public domain (Merton 
1973).  Related, noting that the experiment acts, in part, to increase the effective tax rate on 
individual university researchers, the policy change may also help inform the link between tax 
rates and entrepreneurial activity for an important class of high-skilled workers.  The literature 
on taxes and entrepreneurship has almost exclusively examined sole-proprietors and self-
employed workers (e.g., Gentry and Hubbard 2000), who are typically quite different from the 
growth-creating innovators that motivate many studies of entrepreneurship (Glaeser 2007, 
Levine and Rubinstein 2015).  The experiment in this paper considers a class of innovators who 
work at the frontier of science and technology, face in part a large increase in their effective tax 
rate, and subsequently substantially curtail their entrepreneurial activity. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II details the institutional setting, reviews relevant 
literature, and discusses theoretical advantages and problems that can emerge when increasing 
university rights at the expense of researcher rights.  Section III introduces the data and 
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identification strategy.  Section IV presents the core results of the paper.  Section V discusses 
these findings, including their relevance to broader settings, and Section VI concludes.2   
II. University-Based Innovation 
To frame our research questions and the potential effects of the policy reform, we review here 
the institutional setting of university-based innovation, including the “professor’s privilege” in 
numerous European countries and the details of the Norwegian policy reform.  We then consider 
core conceptual frameworks that can clarify tradeoffs that arise when balancing rights between 
the researcher and the university. 
A. Institutions 
The long-standing upward trend in patenting and new venture activity among U.S. universities 
has triggered an enormous literature investigating university innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Scholars have seen universities as increasingly important wellsprings of innovative ideas, and 
researchers have investigated the legal systems, incentive conditions, organizational attributes, 
technology areas, and local business environment among other features that may help explain the 
relative success of various universities in commercializing innovations both along patenting and 
new venture channels (see, e.g., Lockett et al. 2005, Rothaermel et al. 2007, Grimaldi et al. 2011, 
National Academy of Sciences 2010).  A major thrust of this research (and associated policy 
debate) takes the goal of university-based innovation as given and seeks to understand the 
features that influence its success.3 
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 In addition, Appendix I presents a simple model to further clarify motivations and pitfalls when giving majority 
rights to the university at the expense of the individual researcher.  Appendix II considers additional empirical 
findings, studying the publication behavior of university researchers and how this changes with the reform. 
3
 Separately, many scholars have addressed whether universities should engage in commercial innovation activity 
given potential tradeoffs with other activities, especially basic research (e.g., Krimsky 2003, Washburn 2008, 
National Academy of Sciences 2010). These potential tradeoffs bear on a complete assessment of the welfare 
consequences of commercialization policy.  In prior literature, however, individual-level publishing and patenting 
appear positively rather than negatively correlated (e.g., Fabrizio and Di Minin 2008, Azoulay et al. 2007, Buenstorf 
2009) which suggests that basic research and invention may be complements rather than substitutes.  This finding is 
consistent with conceptualizations of scientific progress based on Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes 1997), so that the 
tradeoffs between research and invention may not be so acute.  In Appendix II, we examine publications in the 
context of our data and confirm a positive correlation between patenting and publications at the individual level.  We 
further examine publication output within individual researchers, harnessing the reform as a shock to patenting 
incentives, and find no evidence that publications and patents are substitute activities. See Appendix II. 
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The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act is a signal event for researchers and policymakers in this space. The 
law eliminated U.S. government claims to university-based innovation, giving U.S. universities 
the rights to innovative ideas that were federally funded.  Studies have since examined the 
potential effects of Bayh-Dole on patent rates (e.g., Mowery et al. 2001), patent quality (e.g., 
Henderson et al. 1998), and entrepreneurship (e.g., Shane 2004) among other issues.  
Interestingly, while U.S. university patenting rates were approximately five times larger in 1999 
than in 1980, there is no evidence that Bayh-Dole caused a structural break in the pre-existing 
trend (Mowery and Sampat 2005).   
The acceleration of patenting and licensing from U.S. universities eventually caught the attention 
of European policymakers, who concluded that European universities lagged their U.S. 
counterparts in commercialization outcomes (Geuna and Rossi 2011).  European policymakers 
associated Bayh-Dole with high rates of university-based innovation and sought to emulate 
Bayh-Dole (Mowery and Sampat 2005, Lissoni et al. 2008). Thus, in the early 2000s, numerous 
European countries passed laws that attempted to encourage universities’ interest and success in 
commercialization. New legislation was implemented in several countries (Germany, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland and Norway) by ending the “professor’s privilege”.  Under the professor’s 
privilege (i.e., prior to the reform), a university researcher retained blanket rights to his or her 
invention.  The new policies shifted substantial rights to the university.  Notably, although policy 
makers in Europe were inspired by the post-Bayh-Dole Act environment in the U.S., the policy 
changes around the professor’s privilege were quite different from the Bayh-Dole Act.  Instead 
of transferring rights away from the government, this transfer came from the researchers 
themselves.  The end result was that these European countries obtained a legislative environment 
similar to that in the U.S. post Bayh-Dole. 
In Norway, the professor’s privilege (laererunntaket in Norwegian) was abolished by unanimous 
Parliament decision in June 2002, and made effective for all public higher education institutions 
from January 1, 2003.4  The new law gave the university the formal ownership rights to the 
commercialization of research (including startups and patents).  Each Norwegian university also 
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 The non-public higher education sector is very small in Norway.  The law change is named Proposition No. 67 of 
the Odelsting (2001–2002).  A full transcript of the Parliamentary session leading to Proposition 67 is available at 
https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/referater/odelstinget/2002-2003/o021107.pdf. 
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formally established a Technology Transfer Office (TTO).5  After the law change, Norwegian 
universities shared one third of the net income with the researcher, so in effect the policy change 
reduced the inventor’s pre-tax expected income by two thirds.6 Given income taxes in Norway, 
this change represents an approximately 33 percentage point increase in the effective tax rate the 
researcher faces when forming new ventures or creating patentable inventions.7 In the case of 
patents, university bylaws obligate the university to claim its property rights within six months 
after the researcher discloses the invention. Should the university decide not to use its option, the 
rights are returned to the inventor. 
The premise behind the policy change was to encourage universities to make investments that 
support patenting and licensing by their researchers and labs, so that this property rights transfer 
would improve commercialization outcomes on net (Czarnitzki et al. 2011).  However, as 
discussed in Section II.A, empirical evidence that could motivate this view was lacking (Lissoni 
et al. 2008).  Moreover, the policy arguments – and literature on the Bayh-Dole Act more 
generally – tend to focus on university-owned IP as the mode of technology transfer from 
universities.  This focus leaves aside the potential for university academics to start companies, 
rather than license, which is a primary commercialization alternative (e.g. Gans and Stern 2003).  
As we will show, both patenting and this “other” commercialization mode – new ventures – 
appear to have been severely affected by the end of the “professor’s privilege”.8 
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 These TTOs were established in 2003, although they were often based on precursor technology offices that had 
been financed by the Norwegian Research Council since 1996.  By 2005, the TTO offices typically had 
approximately ten employees, were led by a director, and were financed partially by the university itself, partially by 
the Norwegian Research Council (FORNY program), and partially by the Ministry of Education (Rasmussen et al. 
2006). 
6
 While Germany included a clause in the new law that the university must share 1/3 of net revenues with the 
researcher, in Norway this norm was not formally established in the law per se but rather was called for by the 
parliamentary committee chairman, who stated explicitly at the time the law was passed that a one-third split with 
the researcher was expected.  This norm was then further formally established in university bylaws later in the 
decade. 
7
 The marginal tax rate in Norway is approximately 50% on both labor and business income, so that pre-reform 100 
kroner in commercialization profits would have net value of about 50 kroner for the researcher. Post-reform the net 
value would be one-third, i.e., 16.7 kroner, so that the post-reform effective tax rate would be 83%. The increase in 
effective tax rate is thus approximately 33 percentage points. 
8
 Interestingly, Lissoni et al. (2008) have shown that, in contrast to the U.S. experience where 69% of university-
based inventions are assigned to universities, the great majority of university-based inventions in France, Italy, and 
Sweden are actually assigned to private firms.  While it is not known whether these firms are new ventures, the 
Lissoni et al. study raises further questions about the empirical motivation for the European policy reforms.  Once 
these privately-owned patents are accounted for, university researchers in these three European countries (especially 
Sweden) show only modestly lower patenting rates than U.S. universities, which undercuts the empirical view that 
European universities were laggards in commercialization activities in the first place. 
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B. Theoretical Perspectives 
Several theoretical perspectives could be used to motivate the professor’s privilege reform (and, 
by extension, motivate systems like those typically found in the U.S. and many other countries 
today).  However, theory also suggests substantial caution.  This section reviews core 
perspectives in the economics of innovation to better understand the motivations and pitfalls 
associated with the policy change.  The richness of these theories suggests the importance of 
empirical analysis.  The empirical analysis in turn can help limit the set of relevant mechanisms, 
as we will further discuss in Section V.   
Fundamentally, the professor’s privilege reform creates a large shift in the allocation of rights, 
and core theoretical ideas in the economics of innovation engage these issues (Aghion and Tirole 
1994, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Scotchmer 2004, Hellman 2007).  Aghion and Tirole (1994) 
provide canonical analysis of innovation contexts where different agents bear private costs but 
share in future payoffs and emphasize the challenge in effectively balancing incentives across 
investing parties.  A broad intuition in these theories is that rights should be balanced toward the 
party whose investment matters more.9 
A natural mapping to the university-based innovation context is the rights allocation between the 
researcher and the research institution, where both may make separate investments in pursuit of a 
commercial outcome.  Investments by the individual researcher, as the source of the ideas, 
appear critical.  The university may also play important roles by supporting infrastructure for 
applied research, searching for commercializable ideas within university laboratories, facilitating 
patent applications, managing licensing, and otherwise investing to promote successful 
commercial outcomes (e.g., Rothaermel et al. 2007).  For instance, noting potentially substantial 
costs in time and money to achieve a patent (e.g., Hall 2007, Gans et al. 2008), it can be natural 
for such costs to limit entry, and university researchers report that they do (e.g., Baldini 2009).  
Should the establishment of a TTO reduce entry costs (e.g., via scale advantages in providing 
commercialization services), it is possible that the professor’s privilege reform could encourage 
more university technology transfer.  Universities and their TTOs may also act as useful 
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 Other things equal, giving a greater share of the surplus to the party whose investment affects the surplus more will 
encourage more surplus creation. It is possible to undo this intuition, however, if a particular agent’s effort responds 
relatively weakly to their share (for example, if a party faces a multitasking problem and would not devote effort to 
creating this particular joint surplus even if given substantial rights to it). 
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intermediaries in markets for technology and improve the quality of innovative outcomes (e.g., 
Macho-Stadler et al. 2007). 
The professor’s privilege reform most directly acts to reallocate income rights.  To the extent that 
investments by both parties matter, giving all income rights to the professor (as in the professor’s 
privilege) may reduce university-based innovation compared to a policy with more balanced rent 
sharing.10  Moreover, one can construct examples where university-based innovation is 
maximized when the university receives two-thirds of the income and the researcher receives 
one-third – as in the more typical regime.  Appendix I provides a formal model and example.  An 
interesting insight is that strengthening the university’s income share (at the expense of the 
researcher’s share) can actually cause the researcher to invest more.  This follows when the 
university’s investment raises the marginal product of the researcher investment (i.e., the 
investments are complements), so that the researcher finds investment more worthwhile even 
though the researcher’s share of the innovation income has declined. 
This income rights reasoning, as a potential a priori justification for the reform, can also point 
out potential pitfalls.  In particular, one may be skeptical about the value of university-level 
investments.  Some scholars argue that university technology transfer offices (TTOs) have poor 
capabilities or inappropriate incentives and suggest reallocating rights toward the faculty in 
pursuit of greater technology transfer (Litan et al. 2007, Kenney and Patton 2009).  To the extent 
that the complementary investments by the university are not especially important, giving the 
university income rights may reduce rather promote innovation (see also Appendix I).  In 
practice, the appropriate income rights allocation in the university context remains unknown.  
Looking more closely at researcher interests, the professor’s privilege reform might also be 
motivated in a belief that university researchers may care relatively little about income, so that 
lessened income rights would have little effect on researcher’s entrepreneurial or inventive 
effort.  For example, Mertonian norms of science, including classic ideas of communalism and 
disinterestedness that emphasize the placement of research outputs in the public domain (Merton 
1973), may suggest relatively weak links between personal financial reward and effort in the 
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 Incentive mechanisms limited to sharing the joint surplus are known to be an imperfect instrument for achieving 
first-best effort (Holmstrom 1982).  Thus neither the professor’s privilege nor the post-reform regime with a one-
third / two-third split would produce first-best investment. At the same time, second-best outcomes will typically 
depend on a careful balance of income rights across the investing parties. 
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university setting. Evidence suggests that university-based researchers on average value income 
relatively less than industrial researchers (Stern 2004), and entrepreneurs in general appear to 
have strong tastes for autonomy and other motivational characteristics distinct from income (e.g., 
Evans and Leighton 1989, Hamilton 2000, Shane et al. 2003).  Moreover, studies of university 
entrepreneurs further suggest the importance of motivations beyond income and distinct traits 
from other university researchers (Roach and Sauermann 2012).  The extent to which university-
based innovators, or high-skill innovators more generally, react to effective tax rates appears 
unknown. 
Beyond changing income shares, the professor’s privilege reform also affected control rights, 
noting that the university gained decision-making authority over knowledge-related assets.  Such 
control rights may matter to the extent that university and researcher interests are not aligned and 
contracts are incomplete.  As one example, the researcher might prefer her patented invention to 
be used as widely as possible, while the university may prefer monopoly pricing.  Beyond issues 
of how the surplus is ultimately split, disagreement may result in Williamsonian haggling costs 
that further destroy surplus.  Anticipation of such haggling may in turn dissuade effort.   
While theories emphasizing rights allocations in the economics of innovation are highly 
influential, empirical studies examining these theories remain relatively few (Lerner & Merges 
1998; Lach and Schankerman 2008, Lerner & Malmendier 2010).  Coupling the “professor’s 
privilege” reform with the richness of Norwegian data provides a context for examining the 
potential importance of rights allocations, leveraging a large change in the rights regime. 
Overall, integrating across these theoretical perspectives, there are many contending ways in 
which the professor’s privilege reform might affect university-based innovation.  The actual 
effects are very much an empirical question, which we turn to next. 
III. Data and Identification 
In this section, we describe the data sets and the econometric methods we employ. 
A. Data 
The startup analysis draws on several Norwegian register databases.  The socio-demographic 
data, compiled by Statistics Norway, covers the Norwegian adult population and consists of 
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yearly records of workplace ID in addition to education level, gender, income, wealth, marital 
status, and many other variables.  We identify university employees through their workplace ID 
and researchers as individuals with a PhD degree.  These university-employed PhDs are the 
‘treatment group’ in our analyses. 
The startup data, collected from the government registry “Bronnoysundregisteret”, covers the 
population of incorporated companies started in Norway between 2000 and 2007, and provides 
total equity, owner ID, and ownership shares at the incorporation date.  The owner ID, which is 
available for any individual who owns at least 10% of the company, can be matched to the 
sociodemographic data, and in this manner we identify new firms started up by university 
researchers as well as the sociodemographic characteristics of entrepreneurs more generally.  
The data further contains anonymous ID numbers for the startups, which allows us to match at 
firm level with longitudinal, yearly, accounting data collected from Dun & Bradstreet. The 
accounting data runs through 2012; it identifies which sector the startup operates in and contains 
annual measures of startup performance such as sales, profits and employees.11 
The patenting analysis is based on separate data collected from several sources.  We first 
obtained a list of the names of university-sector researchers for the period 1995-2010 from the 
Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education (NIFU).12  There are 11,905 
unique university researchers in this data.  In addition to full names, this dataset contains 
sociodemograhic information such as gender, age, and PhD type, as well as the specific 
university employer.  From the Norwegian Patent Office (NPO) we obtained a list of all 
Norwegian patents issued to inventors in Norway from 1990-2014.13  We then matched the 
names from NIFU with the inventor names in the patent data to determine which patents had 
university inventors.  These matches are based on employment at the university at the time of the 
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 Note that we focus on incorporated companies, which does not include self-employment.  Levine and Rubinstein 
(2015) show in the U.S. context that incorporation is an important indicator for locating growth-creating innovators 
and organizations, while self-employment is misleading for capturing such entrepreneurial firms.  As in other 
industrialized countries, starting an incorporated company in Norway carries tax benefits relative to self-
employment (e.g., write-offs for expenses such as home office, company car, and computer equipment). With the 
exception of very small projects, incorporation is more tax efficient than self-employment status. The formal capital 
requirement for registering an incorporated company was NOK 100,000 (EUR 13,000) during the study period. 
Incorporated companies are required to have an external auditor certify annual accounting statements submitted to 
tax authorities. 
12
 The NIFU list of university researchers is biannual for 1995-2006 and annual for 2007-2010. 
13
 These Norwegian patents include patents that were granted by the European Patent Office and then waived in by 
the Norwegian Patent Office. 
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patent application.  The matching procedure uses full first names and surnames; robustness 
checks to account for  potential noise in name-matching for the patent data are included below.  
We further matched all the NPO patents with the European Patent Office’s PATSTAT database, 
to determine the number of citations each Norwegian patent receives.14 
Table 1A provides summary statistics for start-up firms in Norway between 2000 and 2007. In 
total there were 48,844 startups and 128 of these were started up by individuals with PhDs 
employed at a university.  We define a university startup as a newly incorporated company 
where at least one of the initial owners is a full-time university employee with a PhD.  By 
comparison, there were 452 start-ups by individuals with PhDs who were not employed at 
universities.  Overall, we see that university PhD start-ups were substantially more likely to 
survive than companies started by the broader background population, while survival among 
non-university PhD startups is more similar.15  University PhD startups tend to be somewhat 
smaller in employees, sales, and profits than non-university start-ups, with a closer match to non-
university PhD startups.16  Comparing the university PhD start-ups and non-university PhD 
startups, t-tests indicate that differences in means are not statistically significant except for 
profits at 5 years.17  Looking at median outcomes, the firms at five years tend to be very small.  
The 75th percentile company in each category features 1-3 employees while sales reach 1.2-3.3 
million NOK, depending on the population, while the 95th percentile companies are substantially 
larger, with 5-12 employees and sales of 6.9-16.4 million NOK across categories.  Overall, we 
see greater performance similarity among start-ups by PhDs than with start-ups in the 
background population.  These findings also indicate the relative rarity of substantial 
entrepreneurial success, which suggests the low likelihood of substantial returns to starting new 
companies.18 
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 We are indebted to Stefano Breschi for help in matching the NPO and EPO data. 
15
 Non-surviving firms are defined as those that stop reporting profits or whose sales fall below 50 thousand NOK 
after their first year. 
16
 Performance at five years is not conditional on survival.  The greater survival but lower average performance is 
consistent, for example, with university PhDs relying less on the start-up for income, given their university 
employment, and hence being more likely to continue with lower performing firms.  
17
 These t-tests for differences in sample means find p-values as follows: survival (p=.28), sales (p=.61), employees 
(p=.14), and profits (p=.064). 
18
 See Guzman and Stern (2015a, 2015b) for analysis of the rarity of high-growth entrepreneurship in the U.S. and in 
the environs of U.S. universities. 
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Table 1B provides summary statistics on entrepreneurs in Norway.  On average, university 
entrepreneurs are older, more educated, higher income, and more likely to be male and married 
than non-university entrepreneurs.  Compared to non-university PhD entrepreneurs, the 
university entrepreneurs look much more similar.  By construction, individuals in both groups 
have PhDs.  They also have similar average ages (47) when starting companies and similar 
marital status (74% married).  The income and wealth for the non-university PhDs is somewhat 
larger and the non-university PhD entrepreneurs are slightly less likely to be male.19 
Table 1C provides summary statistics for patents.  We see that 431 university researchers 
produced 750 patents over the 1995-2010 period.  Although about two-thirds of the university 
PhD workforce is male, university inventors are 93% male.  The background population of 
Norwegian inventors is estimated to be 94% male.  The substantial propensity toward male 
inventors echoes the similar gender propensity seen in entrepreneurship above.  Note that we 
otherwise have little information about the demographics of the Norwegian inventors, as the 
inventor data (which gives full names) does not link to the Norwegian census data (which uses 
anonymized identification numbers). 
Based on the Norwegian census data at the end of 2002, there were 3,747 university researchers 
in Norway, 8,272 PhDs who worked outside universities, and a total Norwegian workforce of 
2.501 million.  The PhD workforce expanded more rapidly than the broader Norwegian 
workforce over the period from 2000-2007.  In particular, the university PhD workforce, non-
university PhD workforce, and total Norwegian workforce grew by 65%, 39%, and 7% 
respectively. 
B. Econometric Approach 
Our analyses primarily consider difference-in-difference regressions, using the end of the 
professor’s privilege to divide the sample into pre and post periods and comparing start-up and 
patenting rates inside the university sector (the treatment group) and outside the university sector 
(the control group).  We first study panel models of the following form: 
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 Two sample t-tests indicates no significant difference for age (p=.83) or marital status (p=.89) while there is a 
marginally significant difference for gender (p=.095) and differences for prior year earnings (p=.017) and wealth 
(p=.040).  The somewhat greater income of the non-university PhDs is consistent with observations elsewhere that 
university researchers are paid less than those taking jobs in industry (Stern 2004).  In the regression analyses below, 
the results are robust to including individual fixed effects as well as time-varying, individual-level controls. 
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 = 	
 + 
 + 
 × 	
 +    (1) 
where the dependent variable  is a count of start-ups or patents, 	
 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in years after the reform (2003 or later), and 
 is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
observation represents universities – i.e. those affected by the end of the “professor’s privilege”.  
We start by looking simply at the pre-post difference for university start-up rates and patent 
counts, before introducing control groups (start-up and patenting behavior in Norway more 
generally) and using the difference-in-difference specification in (1). 
When using data at the sector or individual level, we extend the panel model in (1) to incorporate 
sector or individual fixed effects () and time fixed effects ().  In some specifications we will 
also incorporate time-varying individual characteristics (), such as lagged income and wealth.  
These difference-in-difference regressions thus generally take the form:20 
 =  +  + 
 + 
 × 	
 +  +   (2) 
In the relevant regression models, we cluster standard errors at the individual level. 
IV. Results 
In this section we present the main results of the paper.  We consider entrepreneurship in Section 
IV.A and patents in Section IV.B. 
A. Startups 
The Rate of Entrepreneurship 
We first consider how the rate of start-ups for university researchers changes after the reform and 
then compare it to changes in start-up rates for the background Norwegian population.  Figure 
1A plots the annual number of university start-ups (red line, left vertical axis) and non-university 
startups (blue line, right vertical axis) over the sample period.21  While the non-university startup 
rate is approximately constant across years, the university startup rate drops dramatically from 
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 Note that the time fixed effects absorb the 	
  term.  The sector-level fixed effects do not absorb the 
  
term because treatment status varies within sectors.  The individual fixed effects do not in general absorb the 
  
term because individuals may move between university and non-university employment.   
21
 The vertical axes in Figure 3 and related figures in the paper begin at 0 so that the percentage changes in the data 
being compared can be seen visually. 
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the pre-reform (2000-2002) to the post-reform (2003-2007) period.  The pre-reform period 
averaged 24.7 university start-ups per year, while the post-reform period averaged 10.8 
university startups per year, for a drop of 56%.    
Figure 1B considers the same data on a per-worker basis for the relevant groups.  On average, 
0.678% of university researchers started a new firm in a given year prior to the reform, while 
0.224% of university researchers started a new firm in a given year after the reform, for a 67% 
drop in the per-worker rate.  The drop is slightly larger on a per-worker basis (Figure 1B) than on 
a count basis (Figure 1A) because the number of university researchers is increasing relatively 
rapidly over the period compared to the Norwegian workforce as a whole.   
Together, these figures show a sharp drop in entrepreneurship by university researchers that is 
coincident with the professor’s privilege reform.  By contrast, the start-up rate for the 
background population is largely flat, increasing 5.9% comparing the post and pre periods 
(Figure 1A) and increasing 2.1% on a per-capita basis (Figure 1B).  Thus, the large decline in 
start-up rates by university researchers is not seen in the background Norwegian population.  
The “visual” differences-in-differences shown in Figure 1 are explored further by regression.  
Table 2 presents aggregate analysis, looking at changes in log annual counts per year and log 
annual counts per worker.  The regressions implement the econometric model (1).  Examining 
the 
 × 	
 coefficient, we see that the drops in both start-up counts and start-up counts 
per worker are statistically significant compared to the Norwegian workforce as a whole 
(columns (1) and (2)).  On net, and consistent with the mean changes seen in Figure 1, we find a 
67% decline (i.e., 1-e-1.102) in the start-up rate per worker comparing university PhDs against the 
Norwegian workforce.  Columns (3) and (4) repeat this analysis using PhDs not employed at 
university as the control group.  We again see statistically significant declines in startups by 
university PhDs, with a 49% decline in start-ups per worker comparing university PhDs against 
non-university PhDs. 
Table 2 further considers sector-level analysis.  This analysis can account for compositional 
changes in the sectors of start-up activity that might otherwise influence the results.  In this 
analysis, the start-up counts are constructed by sector-year for the treatment and control groups, 
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where sector is determined by the 1-digit NACE code.22  Columns (5) and (6) examine the log 
start-up count as the dependent variable, and shows broadly similar results using either control 
group.  Because this approach drops sector-years with zero counts, column (7) repeats the 
analysis with a Poisson count model that includes the full set of observations.  The difference-in-
difference drop in university start-up rates is now 45%. 
Table 3 considers regression evidence at the individual level, using econometric model (2) and 
exploiting data for every individual in the Norwegian workforce.  The dependent variable is now 
binary, indicating whether a given individual started a company in a given year.  We use a linear 
probability model, which allows the inclusion of individual fixed effects, with standard errors 
clustered by the individual.  Non-linear models, such as logit or probit, show similar results.23  
Column (1) presents the simplest analysis, with no individual-level controls.  Column (2) adds 
individual and year fixed effects, and column (3) additionally adds time-varying individual-level 
information, including age fixed effects, fixed effects for highest educational degree, marital 
status, lagged income, and lagged wealth.24  The latter two specifications allow us to control for 
population differences between the treatment and control groups – either via unobservable, fixed 
individual level characteristics or several observable and time-varying characteristics – that may 
explain individual startup tendencies, including possible compositional changes with time that 
might create shifts around the reform year.  In practice, we see little change in the 
 ×
	
 coefficient when adding these controls, which suggests that changes in the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the underlying populations in the treatment and control samples do not drive 
the results.  Given that most Norwegian workers do not start companies, columns (4) and (5) 
repeat the individual-level specifications while restricting the sample to those individuals who 
started at least one company in the 2000-2007 period.  These regressions show that, conditional 
on starting a company at some point, university PhD entrepreneurs were far less likely to do so 
after the reform compared to other active entrepreneurs in Norway. The magnitude of the effect 
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 We use 1-digit sectors because start-up counts for the treatment group are not large enough to allow analysis for 
more granular sector categorizations.  NACE is the standard industrial classification system in the European Union. 
23
 We present the linear probability model primarily to allow inclusion of individual fixed effects and to compare 
results with and without these fixed effects.  Logit or probit specifications are also presented below as alternatives 
and typically show more precise results (smaller standard errors).  Given the increased precision seen with the non-
linear models, the emphasis on the linear probability model in the exposition also appears conservative.  Complete 
results using non-linear models are available from the authors upon request. 
24
 Income and wealth controls for each worker are quadratics in the log of each variable, lagged by one year.  Wealth 
is provided in the registry data due to the Norwegian tax code, which includes a wealth tax. 
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in these individual-level analyses remains very large.  For example, using column (1), the 
propensity for university PhDs to start companies declines by 63% after the reform.25 
In Table 1A we see that a small minority of Norwegian entrepreneurs have advanced degrees, 
especially PhDs.  Table 4 thus presents further individual-level analysis, using control samples of 
workers who share increasingly similar observable characteristics to university researchers.  
Column (1) of Table 4 limits the control group to those with at least a Master’s degree and shows 
large declines in startup propensities of university researchers compared to this narrower control 
group.  The remaining columns of Table 4 limit the control group to those with PhDs, who thus 
match the educational attainment of the university researchers.  Column (2) suggests a somewhat 
less precise effect for this control group using the linear probability model (p=.11) while non-
linear models show greater precision as shown in column (3) (p<.001).  Using a propensity score 
match to find the single nearest neighbor to each university-employed PhD, with matching based 
on age, PhD type, gender, and marital status, the magnitude and statistical significance using the 
linear probability model increases, as shown in column (4).  This propensity-score sample 
provides the most closely matched control group to the university workers.  In columns (5) and 
(6), the sample is restricted to those who started at least one company in the 2000-2007 period.  
Conditional on starting a company at some point, university PhD entrepreneurs were far less 
likely to do so after the reform compared to other PhD entrepreneurs in Norway.   
While the PhD control group shares close observable similarities to the treatment group, which 
may provide identification advantages, this control group might also be entangled to some degree 
by the reform.  For instance, the university’s rights may extend to recent PhD students, to the 
extent their innovations are based on research conducted while at the university.  Column (7) 
thus drops those with recently received PhDs.  We see slightly larger and more precise effects 
than before with the linear probability model.  More generally, to the extent that startups by non-
university PhDs (the control group) could be negatively affected by the reform, either because 
PhDs themselves were recently university-based researchers or because they tend to start 
companies in partnership with university researchers, the difference-in-difference results 
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 To see this magnitude, consider that the mean of the dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is 0.00389 of Table 3.  
Looking at column (1), we see that university PhDs, prior to the reform, started companies at a rate 0.00358 higher, 
or at about twice the background rate for the average Norwegian worker.  After the end of the professor’s privilege, 
university PhDs start companies at a rate 0.00450 less than before, which is a 63% decline in their prior rate. 
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comparing university and non-university PhDs would be biased against finding effects, i.e., 
conservatively.  One might alternatively imagine sources of non-conservative biases for this 
control sample, although the plausibility for the reform positively affecting startups by non-
university PhDs may be limited.26  To the extent that the reform affects non-university PhDs in 
ways that could lead to biases, one may return toward the analyses using broader control 
populations, as featured first above. 
We can further investigate underlying margins of response by university researchers.  One 
question is whether the decline in university entrepreneurship is seen among individuals who 
remain employed at the university (the intensive margin) versus a decline driven by 
entrepreneurially minded individuals leaving the university (the extensive margin).  The latter 
case, were it the main story, might suggest substitution in the accounting for university-based 
entrepreneurship rather than a decline in entrepreneurship from these individuals. 
Table 5 provides evidence to tease out these dimensions.  We first consider a balanced panel of 
individuals over the 2000-2007 period and define “pre-period university researchers” as those 
who were employed at universities from 2000-2002.  In columns (1) through (3), we analyze the 
start-up rates for these workers, regardless of whether they stay at university, compared against 
workers who were not employed at universities over the period of our data.  This analysis 
includes among the treated any start-up created by a university researcher after the individual 
leaves the university.  The findings are similar to the earlier findings.  Thus the decline in start-
ups in university settings is not offset by university researchers departing the university and 
starting new firms. 
Table 5 further considers the intensive margin of “stayers”, defined as university researchers who 
are employed at the university throughout the 2000-2007 period.  The control group consists of 
workers who were never employed at universities during the 2000-2007 period.  Columns (4) 
through (6) show that the “stayers”, who are the large majority of university researchers, 
experience a large decline in entrepreneurship.  The results for “stayers” are extremely similar to 
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 One mechanism might be as follows. To the extent that non-university PhD startups compete with university PhD 
startups, the decline in university PhD startups might potentially encourage more entry by the non-university PhD 
group.  This possibility is hard to test specifically, although the broader evidence and environment does not suggest 
it.  For example, the non-university PhD startup rate doesn’t go up in absolute terms after the reform, and more 
generally university researcher startups are a very small percentage of businesses in any sector, which may limit the 
plausibility of such competition effects. 
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the prior results.  Thus there is strong evidence of reform effects at the intensive margin:  the 
decline in entrepreneurship came among a consistent set of university employees, who started 
firms at lower rates after the reform than they did before. 
The Quality of Entrepreneurship 
Beyond the quantity of startups, we can also consider the quality of startups and whether this 
changes after the reform.  We examine the rate of survival as well as the sales, employees, and 
assets of new ventures.  Lastly, we consider measures for the technology-orientation of start-up 
firms and the patenting behavior of university start-ups. 
Tables 6A and 6B consider start-up performance before and after the reform.  As before, we use 
differences-in-differences.  In Columns (1)-(4) of Table 6A, the control group is the background 
population of new ventures in Norway.  Column (1) shows the probability of survival to year 5.  
We see a weakly significant but large decline of 15 percentage points in the probability of 
survival by university start-ups after the reform.  Conditional on survival, sales also become 
substantially lower for university start-ups, while employment in and the assets of these startups 
are negative but statistically insignificant.  When comparing to start-ups by non-university PhDs 
in Columns (5)-(8), the results appear broadly similar in their point estimates but with less 
precision, so that there is no statistical significance at conventional levels.  
Table 6B considers performance at year 5 using a binary dependent variable for whether the 
performance indicator is in the upper quartile of performance among Norwegian new ventures.  
This analysis can account transparently for changes in the rate of “relatively good” startups while 
avoiding upper tail outliers that can otherwise influence the results.27  The threshold for an upper 
quartile start-up is 3.3 million NOK in sales and 3 employees at an age of 5 years.28  The 
findings in Table 6B broadly echo the above results.  The probability that a university startup 
surpasses the 75th percentile of sales declines by 12 percentage points at conventional 
significance levels after the reform, compared to other startups.  The probability of surpassing 
the 75th percentile of assets at year 5 declines by a similar magnitude while employment shows 
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 In general, evidence suggests that successful startups are rare, even in clusters around universities (Guzman and 
Stern 2015a, 2015b), and the evidence about firm size in Table 1A further suggests the thick upper tail in startup 
growth, so that mean regression analysis of performance may be driven by outliers. 
28
 The upper quartile is determined across the set of all new ventures (i.e., including those that do not survive to five 
years, for which we impute a value of 0 for sales, assets, and employees). 
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little effects.  As before, effects are statistically weaker, but broadly similar in magnitude, when 
using the non-university PhD start-ups as the control group. 
Separately from accounting performance, and with the caveat that sample sizes become small, 
we can further examine whether there is a decline in higher-technology start-ups.  To perform 
this analysis, we examine start-up counts again but now use the Eurostat classifications of 2-digit 
NACE codes to exclude (a) manufacturing sectors that are defined as “low-technology” and (b) 
service sectors that are considered “less knowledge intensive.”29  Table 6C considers the 
aggregated counts, using the same regression as in Table 2 but now counting only the remaining, 
higher-technology firms.   
Table 6C column (1) indicates a substantial decline in higher-technology startups by university 
researchers after the reform when compared to higher-technology startups in Norway as a whole.  
Column (2) shows a negative but insignificant decline compared to non-university PhDs.  In both 
column 1 and column 2, the 	
	dummy is notably negative and significant, indicating that 
higher-technology start-ups declined more generally in Norway after the reform.  The decline 
seen in the 	
 dummy is driven by the decline in information and computing technology (ICT) 
startups across Norway.30  Columns (3) and (4) show, removing such ICT startups from the 
sample, the 	
 coefficient is no longer large or significant.  These columns further show large, 
negative effects of the decline in (non ICT) technology-oriented startups from university 
researchers, with similar size effects using either control group.31  Poisson models (not reported) 
rather than OLS show similar effects with increased precision.  The decline in higher-technology 
start-ups by university researchers can also be seen in individual-level analysis, controlling for 
individual level characteristics.32  Notably, the difference-in-difference decline in technology 
start-up rates in columns (3) and (4) implies a 71% drop.  This decline is larger than the decline 
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 The Eurostat sectoral classifications by technological-intensity can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf. 
30
 Startups in “computer and related activities” (NACE code 72) were frequent in the early 2000s in Norway, as they 
were elsewhere. 
31
 These findings are also consistent with the findings in Table 2, which analyzed counts at the 1-digit sector level.  
Overall, PhDs are more active in higher-technology sectors than the general population and were more active in ICT 
startups as well.  When controlling for sector, the results become more similar across the control groups.  See 
columns 5-7 of Table 2 as well as Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6C. 
32
 These further analyses follow those in Tables 3 and 4.  Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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for university start-ups generally, indicating that these university technology startups fell 
proportionately more on average, although this excess decline is not statistically significant.33 
Lastly, we collected the incorporation documents for all university start-ups to search for patents 
by these young firms. In particular, we searched the Norwegian Patent Office database for 
patents where the start-up was listed as either the applicant or the assignee.  We found that, 
among startups by university researchers founded prior to the reform, 12% obtained a patent 
within five years of founding. Among university startups founded after the reform, only 2% 
percent obtained a patent within this window.  This decline is significant at the 1% level using a 
simple t-test.   
Overall, integrating across performance measures based on accounting data, technology-intensity 
of the sector, or patenting, these results indicate that start-up performance measures, if anything, 
declined after the end of the professor’s privilege. 
Hidden Ownership 
As a robustness check, we further considered whether the end of professor’s privilege might 
potentially provoke “hidden ownership”, where university researchers continue to start 
businesses but attempt to shield their ownership via family members or possibly through pre-
existing companies.  We can test this possibility in two ways.  First, the Norwegian registry data 
identifies the family members of each worker.  We can therefore also examine new venture 
activity by the family members of university researchers and test for any increase, after the 
reform, in businesses started by family members. Second, the Norwegian business registry traces 
ownership of businesses by other businesses.  We can therefore additionally ask whether 
university researchers might own new start-ups indirectly through other companies the 
researchers own, thus opening a different potential means of attempting to hide ownership from 
the university.  Implementing these analyses, we find no evidence for hidden ownership.  There 
is no increase in start-ups among family members.  Moreover, taking all firms owned by 
university researchers, we find zero cases of such indirect ownership of new firms.34 
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 Prior to the reform, 27% of university-based start-ups were in higher-technology sectors (41% including ICT); 
after the reform only 17% of university-based startups were in these sectors (33% including ICT). 
34
 These analyses are available from the authors upon request. 
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Summary 
In sum, we see a large drop in entrepreneurship by university researchers starting in the year of 
the professor’s privilege reform.  This decline (56%) appears in a simple pre-post of university 
researcher start-up behavior, and it appears similarly large when compared to the background 
startup rates for a range of control groups.  Detailed individual-level controls do not change this 
conclusion, which is driven on the intensive margin of individual university researchers who 
started firms at a substantially lower rate after the policy reform.  We also see a decline in some 
accounting performance measures for new ventures started by university researchers and, 
separately, a substantial decline in university start-ups in higher-technology sectors or with 
associated patents.  Thus, not only does the quantity of startups by university researchers decline, 
but there are declines in several quality measures for these startups as well. 
B. Patents 
To study patenting, we follow similar lines as the entrepreneurship analysis above but with more 
limited data.  Recall that university-based patents were determined by matching Norwegian 
inventor names with the NIFU registry of Norwegian university researchers (see Section III.A).  
The resulting dataset cannot be linked to the Norwegian registry data; therefore, the patent 
analysis allows comparisons among inventors only (university vs. non-university inventors) and 
does not contain demographic information, beyond name and address, for non-university 
inventors.35   
The Rate of Patenting 
Figure 2A plots the annual number of university patents (red line, left vertical axis) and non-
university patents (blue line, right vertical axis) over the 1995-2010 period, with the year defined 
by the patent application date.36  We see that the non-university patent rate rises through the late 
1990s and then falls somewhat after 2000.  The university patent rate rises similarly in the late 
1990s, with a peak in 2002, the pre-reform year, before falling more steeply in the post-reform 
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 The Norwegian census and business registry data use an anonymized numerical identifier for each individual, 
while the Norwegian Patent Office data does not use such identifiers. Thus we do not have socio-demographic 
information for Norwegian inventors in general (although, via NIFU, we do have detailed information about the 
university researchers, including age, gender, PhD year, PhD type, and academic department). 
36
 We define a patent as a university patent if at least one inventor on the patent matches with a university 
researcher. 
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period.  Figure 2B considers the same data on a per-worker basis for the relevant groups.37  
Given that the number of Norwegian university researchers rose relatively rapidly over the 1995-
2010 period, the per-worker measures show a larger differential drop for the university patenting 
rate.  On average, 1.61% of university researchers applied for a patent in a given year prior to the 
reform, while 0.75% of university researchers applied for patents per year after the reform, for a 
53% drop in the per-worker rate.  By contrast, the broader Norwegian workforce averaged 
0.0176% patents per year prior to the reform and 0.0152% after the reform, for a 14% drop in the 
per-worker rate.  Together, these figures show a sharp drop in patenting by university researchers 
that is coincident with the professor’s privilege reform.  
Table 7 considers regression results, looking at changes in log annual patent counts per year and 
log annual patent counts per worker.  Columns (1) and (2) show that the log number of university 
patents declines relative to non-university patents.  The first column includes a dummy to 
indicate the post period while the second column includes application year fixed effects to better 
capture the background dynamics seen in Figure 2.  The 
 × 	
 coefficient indicates a 
20% decline in patenting by universities.  Column (3) repeats the analysis for patents per-worker.  
Consistent with the larger visual difference-in-difference in Figure 2B, the 
 × 	
  
coefficient now indicates a 48% decline in the patenting rate per university worker, compared to 
the background per-worker rate.   Column (4) considers the number of unique inventors per 
employed worker and finds similarly large declines.  
The last two columns of Table 7 analyze the data in technology-class-by-year form, with the 
patent counts now constructed at the 1-digit IPC code level.38  This analysis can help account for 
compositional changes in the technologies receiving patents.  Column (5) uses the log patent 
count as the dependent variable in OLS, while column (6) presents a Poisson count model.  We 
see that these technology-class level analyses and the aggregate count analyses in columns (1) 
and (2) show similar results. 
Table 8 considers regression evidence at the individual level.  In these regressions, all individuals 
are inventors and the question is how the patenting rate per inventor changes for university 
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 For non-university inventors, this normalization is the number of non-university patents divided by the size of the 
non-university Norwegian workforce. 
38
 As with the start-up analysis, we use 1-digit categories because patent counts for the treatment group are not large 
enough to allow analysis for more granular technology categorizations. 
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inventors compared to non-university inventors.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual applies for one or more patents in a given year.39  Column (1) 
shows that university-based inventors show a large drop in their patenting after the reform, 
where the individual university researcher (conditional on being an inventor at some point) sees a 
4.5 percentage point drop in their probability of producing a patent during the post period.  
Interestingly, this decline almost exactly offsets the tendency for university researchers to 
produce patents more regularly than non-university inventors.  Thus university inventors move 
from being unusually prolific in their patenting rate prior to the reform to being rather ordinary in 
their patenting rate after the reform.   This finding is virtually identical whether or not we control 
for individual fixed effects or application year fixed effects in columns (2) and (3).  Column (4) 
provides a robustness check by reducing the sample (both inside and outside universities) to 
“rare names” – those individuals whose names appear three or less times in the Norwegian 
population as a whole.  We see that the results remain similar. 
Lastly, Table 9 considers whether the decline in university patenting may be driven by the exit of 
university researchers, or whether it appears on the intensive margin of university employees 
who remain at the university.   Commensurate with analysis of Table 5, columns (1) and (2) 
consider “pre-period university researchers”, those individuals employed at universities from 
2000-2002, and then tracks patenting by these individuals regardless of whether they remain in 
university employ.  Columns (3) and (4) focus instead on “stayers”, examining whether the 
patenting decline appears among those who are consistently employed at university in the post 
period.40   The findings are all similar to the results in Table 8.  Thus the decline in patenting in 
university settings is not driven by individual researchers exiting university employment and 
continuing to patent.  Instead, we see large effects on the intensive margin, so that a consistent 
set of individual university inventors patent much less often after the end of the professor’s 
privilege. 
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 Count data models, where the dependent variable is the patent count for the given individual-year as opposed to a 
dummy variable, show similar results.  In practice, conditional on patenting in a given year, 87% of inventors apply 
for one patent only. 
40
 To match the start-up analysis, we define stayers based on continual university employment over the 2000-2007 
period.  The results are robust to alternative employment durations for defining these “stayers”, including using the 
whole sample period for patents (1995-2010).  These results are available upon request. 
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The Quality of Patenting 
Table 10 considers changes in the quality of patenting using a standard proxy measure, the 
number of citations that a patent receives (Trajtenberg 1990, Hall et al. 2005).   Observations are 
individual patents, and we again use difference-in-differences, comparing patents by university 
researchers to patents by non-university researchers, before and after the reform.  The dependent 
variable is the count of citations each patent has received through 2014 using the PATSTAT 
database.  Given the presence of count data, we consider a Poisson model, negative binomial 
model, and for comparison OLS in columns (1) through (3), respectively.  Application year fixed 
effects are included to capture non-linearities in the flow of citation counts over time.41  The final 
columns further consider the propensity for unusually highly-cited patents, where the dependent 
variable is an indicator for an upper tail patent according to a given citation threshold.  Columns 
(4)-(6) use the 75th, 90th, and 99th citation thresholds respectively.42   
Across specifications, we see a robust decline in citations received by university patents.  Using 
either the Poisson or negative binomial model, there is an approximate 25% decline in citations 
received per patent.  As shown by the OLS model, this change represents an average loss of 2.2 
patent citations.  Studying upper-tail patents, the final three columns further show large declines 
in the propensity for university researchers to produce such patents, after the reform.  
Interestingly, the treated coefficient in all specifications indicates that, prior to the reform, 
university patents were more highly cited than non-university patents.  The reform acts to largely 
offset this advantage (compare the 
 × 	
 coefficients with the 
  coefficients), 
so that university patents went from being extraordinary to ordinary in their citations. 
Summary 
In sum, we see a large drop in patenting by university researchers after the “professor’s 
privilege” reform.  This decline is commensurate on many dimensions with the findings for start-
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 Patenting later in the period provides less time to be cited, leading to the usual pattern of declining observed 
citations in more recent application years.  Application year fixed effects help account for this dynamic.  An 
alternative approach is to only include citations that come within N years after publication of the focal patent, and 
end the sample N years prior to 2014.  In this approach, citations are only considered when they come within a 
common length of time.  This alternative approach, for various N, yields similar results to those shown in Table 10 
(results available from authors upon request). 
42
 The thresholds are determined, by application year, examining the citation distribution across all issued NPO 
patents with the given application year. 
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ups.  The patent rate per worker falls by approximately 50%, which is broadly similar to the 
decline in the start-up rate.  The decline in patenting, like the decline in entrepreneurship, is 
driven on the intensive margin of individual university researchers who patented substantially 
less after the reform.  Lastly, citations received per patent also declined for university patents 
after the reform.  Overall, and like the start-up analysis, university patenting exhibited a decline 
in both quantity and quality measures. 
V. Discussion 
This section considers the policy experiment and results in light of several existing literatures.  
After summarizing the core empirical findings, we first discuss additional evidence from cross-
country and cross-university empirical studies to help inform potential representativeness for 
broader settings.  We then consider possible tradeoffs between innovative activity and research 
activity among university researchers.  Finally, we discuss mechanisms in light of our findings 
and consider potential applications to literatures regarding rights allocations in innovation and 
taxes and entrepreneurship.    
Summary of Empirical Results 
University researchers are potential wellsprings of innovative ideas that may deliver substantial 
social returns.  A large literature has sought to understand policies that influence innovative 
activity by this workforce, and the design of these policies remains the subject of substantial 
debate.  This paper investigates a large change in national commercialization policy.  In the first 
regime, under the “professor’s privilege”, university-based researchers enjoyed full rights to their 
inventions and new ventures.  In the second regime, after the reform, Norwegian university 
researchers moved to a one-third / two-third income split with the university.  Moreover, the 
universities each established TTOs to boost commercialization output.  The post-reform regime 
was designed to look broadly similar to the U.S. today.  Similar reforms were implemented in 
several European countries, including Germany.   
The empirical findings suggest that the policy reform had several, measurable effects.  First, 
there was an approximate 50% drop in the rate of new venture formation by university 
researchers.  Second, there was a similar drop in patenting.  Third, the quality of new ventures 
and patents also appeared to decline.  These stark findings appear in sharp contrast to the 
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motivations behind the Norwegian policy reform.  The findings may also raise questions about 
similar reforms in other European countries that eliminated the professor’s privilege:  were the 
Norwegian results representative, one would imagine that the rates of start-ups and patenting by 
university researchers would rise substantially, as would the quality of these innovations, should 
universities give the researchers full rights.  More generally, since the post-reform regime looks 
like the U.S. regime, among others, the interest in the external validity of these findings may 
broaden further. 
Representativeness 
As guideposts on the potential generalizability of these results, descriptive facts may be 
informative.  On a cross-country basis, Lissoni (2008) examines the share of academic patents 
among domestic patents for several countries.  The academic patenting share in professor’s 
privilege countries, when the policy is in place, is high (Sweden is 6%, Finland is 8%, and 
Norway is 9%) compared to countries in Europe that did not feature the professor’s privilege 
over similar time periods (France was 3%, Italy was 4%, and the Netherlands was 4%).43  
Comparing across universities in the U.S., Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that university 
licensing income is substantially increasing in the researcher’s royalty share.44  Their regression 
estimates suggest at least a doubling in income comparing universities with a one-third 
researcher share to those with nearly full researcher royalty shares.  Thus, while such cross-
sectional differences do not control for many possible conflating factors, and do not study 
behavior at the individual level, the cross-sectional evidence appears broadly consistent with the 
patent findings in this paper.   
Two new working papers, one studying patenting and the other studying entrepreneurship, also 
consider the professor’s privilege and find evidence in some broadly similar directions.  
Czarnitski et al. (2015) study patenting in Germany and find that university researchers patented 
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 The U.S. academic patenting share is not clear, but university-owned patents in the U.S. are 4% of all U.S. 
patents, and samples suggest that these patents represent perhaps 65-80% of all U.S. patents with academic inventors 
(Fabrizio and DeMinin 2008, Lissoni 2008).  Thus the academic patenting share in the U.S. also appears less than 
that in the professor’s privilege countries, when the policy was in place. 
44
 Lach and Shankerman (2008) study licensing income across universities, a type of data not available in our 
context (changes in licensing income cannot be easily observed since Norwegian universities did not track licensing 
income under the professor’s privilege regime).  Our context looks upstream of licensing income to the patenting 
itself.  The drop in the quantity and quality of patenting after the reform suggests that the pipeline for licensing is 
substantially diminished. 
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less after the professor’s privilege was eliminated.  The decline among university researchers is 
greater than the decline among researchers in public research organizations that were not 
affected by the reform, although a puzzling feature in the German case is that the decline in 
patenting for both groups appears to start 5 years prior to the reform and there is little change in 
the rate of decline around the reform year (2002) per se.  Separately, a recent study by Astebro et 
al. (2015) considers PhDs who exit university employment, comparing the U.S. with Sweden, 
which has maintained its professor’s privilege. The paper finds that Swedish academics are twice 
as likely to exit universities and start firms as U.S. academics are, compared to the background 
rates for non-university PhDs in their respective countries.  
Overall, the difference-in-difference estimates established for all new ventures and patents in 
Norway appear broadly consistent with other evidence.  While the effect of the professor’s 
privilege is difficult to identify using cross-sectional data, and analyses of new ventures are 
especially few, the existing evidence indicates that professor’s privilege countries have tended to 
see greater rates of commercialization activity by academics, often by similar magnitudes as seen 
through the Norwegian policy shock.  These commonalities may suggest broader external 
validity from the natural experiment we study. 
Nonetheless, important caveats are in order as one assesses both the scope of representativeness 
and potential policy implications.  First, the Norwegian university system is predominantly 
public.  This feature is common in European countries but less so in the United States.  It is 
possible that the effects of rights-sharing policies may differ depending on the extent of state 
control, although the limited empirical evidence on this question does not suggest it.45  
Additionally, the effects of a system-wide change may be quite different from the effects of a 
policy change at a single university.46  Thus the results in this paper may generalize more 
                                                           
45
 For example, the public university may believe that any commercialization income will be lost to public coffers.  
That said, the state also has revenue-oriented objectives (and private universities are typically non-profit with 
public-oriented norms), so it is not clear a priori that public universities have more or less pecuniary interests than 
private universities.  Separately, one may make arguments about the relative organizational efficiency of 
universities, depending on their governance.  That said, Lach and Schankerman (2008) examine U.S. public and 
private universities separately and find large increases in licensing income correlated with the inventor’s royalty 
share in both governance settings. 
46
 A system with more heterogeneous royalty structures (i.e., the U.S.) may also allow easier migration of 
innovation-oriented researchers to universities offering them higher royalty shares, as argued by Lach and 
Schankerman (2008).  This migration effect could increase the elasticity of innovative activity to the royalty share 
policy at a given university (by attracting or repelling innovators), yet soften the effect of one university’s policies 
on the broader innovative output of the national system. 
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naturally to public university systems, like those in Europe.  Second, given that the Norwegian 
TTOs were born with the 2003 reform, one may imagine that they are not as effective as more 
experienced TTOs and that their performance might improve with time.  That said, there is no 
evidence within the scope of our data that patenting or new venture rates improve as the years 
progress.  If anything, the decline appears to worsen relative to the controls, but the long-run 
effects may be different, given enough time.  More generally, to the extent that Norway’s 
researchers, technology orientation, access to complementary inputs (e.g., venture financing), 
and broader institutions may differ from those in other countries, the findings may not 
generalize.   
Research Output 
Beyond measures of new ventures and patenting, university commercialization policy may resist 
strong prescriptions given the complexity of welfare analysis in this setting.  Tradeoffs between 
innovative activities and other activities by university researchers (such as basic research or 
teaching), where the social returns may be large but in general are unknown, suggest substantial 
care (Thursby and Thursby 2003, National Academy of Sciences 2010).  While a complete 
welfare description is infeasible, we can make some further progress by looking at publication 
behavior to see if there is any obvious tradeoff with other research outputs.  This analysis is 
provided in Appendix II.   In line with existing studies (e.g., Fabrizio and Di Minin 2008, 
Azoulay et al. 2009, Buenstorf 2009), we find that academic inventors typically appear more 
productive when studying their research publications compared to other university researchers.  
Academic inventors in our study are found to produce not only more publications but also 
publications with higher average citation impact.  These findings, which are robust to field, 
researcher age, and university fixed effects, do not suggest a tradeoff between invention and 
research when comparing across individuals.   
Our analysis can also push further, comparing not just across individuals, but also looking at 
changes within individuals before and after the professor’s privilege reform.  While finding 
adequate control groups raises challenges, we find no evidence that the reform (which led to a 
substantial decline in patenting) encouraged increased publication output among individuals who 
were relatively likely to be affected by the reform.  For example, those university researchers 
who patented in the pre-reform period show no increase in publications compared to closely 
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matched researchers who did not patent in the pre-reform period.  While noisy, point estimates 
suggest if anything a decline in publication outputs after the reform within individuals. See 
Appendix II.   
In sum, we find little evidence for a tradeoff between inventive output and research output.  This 
finding appears across individuals but also appears when looking within individuals and 
harnessing the policy shock of the professor’s privilege reform.  Conceptualizations of science 
based on “Pasteur’s Quadrant” may help explain this result, where the same creativity scientific 
activity may produce both applied output and new knowledge so that inventive and research 
activity become complements rather than substitutes (Stokes 1997, Murray and Stern 2007).  
Mechanisms 
For both new ventures and patenting, we find large declines in quantity after the reform. 
Additional metrics suggest that quality also declined.  These findings appear to reject, in our 
context, several specific mechanisms as driving forces for understanding the results, especially 
regarding the roles that TTOs may play.  First, TTOs might arguably lower the costs of 
commercialization, thus helping university researchers overcome the hurdles of patent 
applications and new venture market entry (e.g., Debackere and Veugelers 2005).  However, 
lowering entry costs would be associated with more innovative entry, not less, which the 
empirical findings appear to strongly reject.  Related, TTOs may perform an important function 
“searching the closets” for latent applied research ideas to increase technology transfer.  
However, were this mechanism the driving force, we would expect the quantity of innovative 
output from the universities to go up, not down.  Third, TTOs might through commercialization 
expertise and/or reputational functions promote higher quality inventions and new ventures (e.g., 
Macho-Stadler et al. 2007).  However, the tendency for quality measures to also decline does not 
point to an effective TTO function in this regard, at least in our context.  In sum, theories 
whereby giving the university rights and the ensuing creation of TTOs will unleash substantial 
additional innovation, either by improving search, selection, or lowering entry costs, appear 
inconsistent with our empirical findings.  The TTOs may still perform these functions at some 
level, but if so the benefits therein are being overwhelmed by other forces. 
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A richer perspective, which may explain the findings, emphasizes the problem of university 
researcher incentives, and how these can be balanced with any rights given to the university 
itself.  The appropriate allocation of rights between investing parties is a classic question in 
economics and also provides canonical perspectives in studies of innovation (Holmstrom 1982, 
Grossman and Hart 1986, Aghion and Tirole 1994, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Hellmann 2007). 
The professor’s privilege reform is a large shock to the rights regime.   
One key element of the reform is the shock to income rights.  Recognizing the potential 
importance of investments by both the university researcher and the university itself, one can 
motivate a royalty sharing regime that favors balancing rights across parties rather than giving all 
royalties to one party, as under the professor’s privilege.  Appendix I studies these tradeoffs 
formally and shows circumstances under which the one-third / two-third split, which is prevalent 
in many countries today, could be (second-best) optimal.47  The basic presumption here is that 
university-level investments are important and cannot be easily replicated by the university 
researcher.  Under circumstances where the university-level investments are much less important 
than researcher-level investments, royalty shares would be optimally balanced toward the 
university researcher.48  Some analyses of commercialization practices, putting little store in 
university capabilities and/or emphasizing incentive conflicts between the parties, have argued 
for sharply curtailing the role of TTOs and increasing researcher’s rights (Litan et al. 2007, 
Kenney and Patton 2009).  The empirical analysis in this paper appears broadly consistent with 
this perspective.  
A related feature that could motivate the reform is the view that university researchers do not 
care (much) for income, so that their investment incentives would be little affected by a loss of 
income rights.  Taking scientific norms of openness seriously, where scientists place the typical 
fruits of their labor (i.e., research articles) in the public domain (Merton 1973), and in many 
cases earn far less than in industry, one might imagine that scientists have weak pecuniary 
interests or otherwise would care little if rights were transferred to the university.  The evidence 
in this paper, by contrast, suggests that the loss of rights severely diminishes the 
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 While proportional sharing of the joint surplus cannot provide first-best efforts (Holmstrom 1982), within the 
class of second-best outcomes, some royalty sharing regimes may be vastly superior to others. 
48
 Appendix I takes an income rights perspective.  A control rights perspective will also tend to suggest that rights 
should favor the party whose investment matters more (e.g., Aghion and Tirole 1994). 
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commercialization activity of university researchers. This finding suggests that, at least among 
those researchers inclined to actually engage in patenting or new ventures, rights matter. 
Taking an income rights view, the policy shock may also provide some insight on the link 
between taxation and entrepreneurship among a class of highly-skilled knowledge workers. In 
particular, the loss of income rights can be thought of in part as increasing the tax rate on 
researcher’s commercialization income.  While the additional effect on university investment 
distinguishes the experiment from a narrower tax experiment on the university researcher, an 
income rights perspective suggests that the policy reform provides a lower bound on the effect of 
an equivalent tax.  Intuitively, should the university investments be at least weakly 
complementary to the researcher’s investments, the taxation effect on the researcher’s income 
incentives is offset to some extent by the benefit of university-level support.  This argument is 
shown formally in Appendix I.   Based on this reasoning, university researchers appear very 
sensitive to the effective tax rates on their expected income, where a loss of two-thirds of pre-tax 
expected income is associated with an approximate fifty percent decline in innovative output, for 
a lower bound tax elasticity of 0.75.  
It may also be, however, that university interests and actions create greater commercialization 
obstacles for the university researcher, rather than providing support.  The professor’s privilege 
reform, in giving majority income rights to the university, also gave the university control rights, 
and control rights perspectives, emphasizing contractual incompleteness and the possibility of 
hold-up by the university, may additionally dissuade university researchers from undertaking 
innovative activities.  It is difficult in our context to separate control rights effects from income 
rights effects, although some considerations suggest that control rights may not be the key 
mechanisms at work here.  Ex-post of our empirical analysis, we conducted telephone interviews 
with the directors of the TTOs at the three largest Norwegian universities.49  These TTO 
directors emphasized that the university researcher retains important de facto control where the 
ongoing involvement of the researcher is essential to commercialization prospects, which is 
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 These universities are the University of Oslo, the University of Bergen, and the Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology in Trondheim. 
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consistent with other literature (e.g., Jensen and Thursby 2001).50  The formal contractual 
incompleteness challenges may also be mitigated here given the ongoing, multi-agent nature of 
the university’s relationships with its researchers, suggesting that relational contracts may limit 
hold-up problems (Levin 2002).  Lastly, to the extent that transaction cost problems would 
materialize as up-front “haggling costs” between researchers and universities, one might expect 
that the loss of control rights would (like a fixed cost) cause the quantity of innovative activity to 
decline but the quality to go up, as only the most worthwhile projects ex-ante would be 
attempted.  The empirical fact that both quantity and quality decline would then reject this 
view.51   
More generally, and integrating across potential theories, the policy experiment indicates that 
these university researchers appear very sensitive to their inventive rights.  While scientists 
might broadly value freedom over income and operate largely according to scientific norms that 
emphasize open access to their ideas (Merton 1973, Stern 2004), there is at least a subset of 
university researchers – those on the margin of important technology transfer avenues – who 
respond with high elasticity to their rights allocations. 
VI. Conclusion 
Following a pan-European policy debate in the 1990s, many European countries abolished the 
“professor’s privilege” in order to boost commercialization activities from universities, and 
moved to a policy regime similar to the U.S. post Bayh-Dole.  This paper has considered the 
policy reform in Norway, deploying registry data and other datasets that allow us to 
comprehensively study new ventures and patenting.  The policy change transferred two-thirds of 
the income rights enjoyed by university researchers to their university employer.  The basic 
empirical finding is a large decline, by approximately 50%, in the quantity of both start-ups and 
patenting by university researchers.  We also see declines in measures of quality for start-ups and 
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 We also find, consistent with this qualitative view, that university researchers are CEOs of their start-ups at a 
stable rate (about 40% of cases) before and after the professor’s privilege reform.  These results are available from 
the authors on request. 
51
 Our findings instead appear consistent with theories emphasizing the decline of commercialization effort by 
university researchers, leading to a worsening quality distribution of their innovations.  With a worsening quality 
distribution and a fixed cost of commercialization, fewer ideas will be started (the quantity effect).  Conditional on 
commercialization, the average quality would also decline. 
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patents.  The declines are robust to using various control groups for the natural experiment and 
are broadly similar when looking across both start-ups and patents. 
The paper further discusses potential implications of these findings for university 
commercialization policy.  Broader interpretations in light of literatures on rights allocations in 
innovation and taxes and entrepreneurship are also considered.  The basic finding is that the 
“professor’s privilege” policy regime in Norway saw far more university-based start-ups and 
patenting than the regime where the university owns the rights and gives one-third of the income 
to the researcher.  This finding raises fundamental questions about whether much of the world, 
which uses university commercialization policies that look like the ex-post regime in this study, 
are producing much less university-based innovation than they could and that many 
policymakers desire.  Studies of additional policy reforms in Europe and the potential for formal 
experimentation in the rights regimes employed by universities are key areas for future research. 
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Figure 1A: University Startups vs. Non-university Startups 
 
Figure 1B: University vs. Non-university Startups, per Worker 
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Figure 2A: University Patents vs. Non-university Patents 
 
Figure 2B: University Patents vs. Non-university Patents, per Worker 
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Table 1A:  Summary Statistics for Start-Up Firms in Norway, 2000-2007 
  Non University Non University Ph.D. University 
Number of Start-Ups  48,844 452 128 
Fraction Surviving  
    at 5 years Mean 0.74 0.83 0.87 
Sales at 5 years 
Mean 
(St Dev) 
Median 
75th ptile 
95th ptile 
5,160  
(13,282) 
1,751 
4,834 
20,769 
2,308  
(4,777) 
628 
2,210 
10,815 
2,659  
(9,934) 
183 
1,550 
9,374 
Employees at 5 years 
Mean 
(St Dev) 
Median 
75th ptile 
95th ptile 
3.31  
(7.77) 
1 
4 
13 
1.68  
(3.16) 
1 
2 
7 
1.22 
(2.89) 
0 
1 
5 
Profits at 5 years 
Mean 
(St Dev) 
Median 
75th ptile 
95th ptile 
198  
(554) 
43.1 
283 
1,358 
220 
(599) 
41.2 
296 
1,555 
100  
(600) 
-6.50 
215 
1,555 
Notes:  Sales, Employees, and Profits are conditional on survival at year 5. Profits and sales are measured 
in 1000 NOK. 
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Table 1B:  Summary Statistics for Entrepreneurs in Norway, 2000-2007 
 Non University Non University Ph.D. University 
Number of Entrepreneurs 69,496 413 125 
Age of Founder, Mean 
   (St Dev) 
   Median 
41.6  
(9.95) 
40 
47.4  
(8.98) 
46 
47.8  
(8.90) 
47 
Fraction with highest degree 
   Bachelors 
   Masters 
   Ph.D. 
0.23 
0.09 
0.006 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Income, Mean 
   (St Dev)  
   Median 
422  
(675) 
343 
752  
(513) 
631 
609  
(265) 
527 
Wealth, Mean 
  (St Dev) 
   Median 
1,520  
(12,200) 
449 
1,610  
(2,910) 
731 
1,140  
(1,550) 
581 
Marital Status, Mean 
   (St Dev) 
   Median 
0.59  
(0.49) 
1 
0.74  
(0.44) 
1 
0.74  
(0.44) 
1 
Fraction male 0.79 0.88 0.94 
Notes:  Income and wealth are measured in 1000 NOK.  Income, wealth, marital status, and age are 
measured in year prior to founding of firm. 
   
Table 1C:  Summary Statistics for Patenting in Norway 
 All Norway University 
Number of Patents 7,341 750 
Number of Unique Inventors 6,890 431 
Percentage Male, workforce 50.4% 65.9% 
Percentage Male, Inventors 94.3%* 92.8% 
Period 1995-2010 1995-2010 
Notes:  *Male percentage for all inventors is estimated using gender for common names in Norway.  
(Other gender calculations are not estimates; gender for university sample is given directly by NIFU 
database and for Norwegian workforce from census data.) 
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Table 2: Startups, Aggregate and Sector Level Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Aggregate  Sector  
 
Log 
Startups 
Log 
Startups 
Per 
Worker 
Log 
Startups 
Log 
Startups 
Per 
Worker 
Log 
Startups 
Log 
Startups Startups 
        
Treated  x Post -0.912*** -1.102*** -0.603** -0.667** -0.504* -0.431* -0.591*** 
 (0.172) (0.179) (0.232) (0.242) (0.265) (0.224) (0.206) 
Treated -5.477*** 1.167*** -0.961*** -0.998 -5.214*** -1.450*** -0.969*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0614) (0.110) (0.128) (0.229) (0.250) (0.103) 
Post 0.0517 0.0163 -0.258 -0.478** -- -- -- 
 (0.0671) (0.0650) (0.170) (0.113)    
Year FE -- -- -- -- Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE -- -- -- -- Yes Yes Yes 
Control  
Sample 
Norwegian 
Workforce 
Norwegian 
Workforce 
PhD 
workforce 
PhD 
workforce 
Norwegian 
Workforce 
PhD 
workforce 
PhD 
workforce 
Period 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson 
Observations 16 16 16 16 120 108 160 
R-squared 0.997 0.849 0.909 0.800 0.97 0.78 -- 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) consider aggregate counts per year for the treatment and control groups.  Columns (2) 
and (4) consider aggregate counts per worker.   In columns (5)-(7), observations are sector x year for the treatment 
and control groups, with sector determined by the 1-digit NACE code.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Startups, Individual Level, All Workers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All 
Workers 
All 
Workers 
All 
Workers 
Entrepreneurs 
only 
Entrepreneurs 
only 
      
Treated x Post -0.00450*** -0.00457*** -0.00431*** -0.131*** -0.114*** 
 (0.000974) (0.00110) (0.00111) (0.0283) (0.0285) 
Treated 0.00358*** 0.000343 -0.000142 -0.000436 -0.0136 
 (0.000914) (0.00156) (0.00160) (0.0440) (0.0450) 
Post -0.000275*** -- -- -- -- 
 (2.88e-05)     
Observations 19,937,044 19,937,044 19,937,044 535,039 535,039 
R-squared 0.000 0.164 0.165 0.029 0.032 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Individual FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Individual time-
varying controls NO NO YES NO YES 
Period 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual started a company that year.  Estimates are 
the linear probability model.  Non-linear probability models (Probit or Logit) produce similar results, as discussed in 
text.  The individual time-varying controls include lagged marital status, lagged total years of education dummies, 
log income, and log wealth.  Standard errors are clustered by individual (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 4: Startups, Individual Level, Similar Workers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Masters or 
more 
Ph.D. Ph.D. Logit 
Ph.D. 
Propensity 
Score Match 
Ph.D. 
Entrepreneurs 
only 
Ph.D. 
Entrepreneurs 
only 
Ph.D. 
Earned pre 
2000 
        
Treated x Post 
-0.00339*** -0.00231 -0.00177*** -0.00382** -0.0865*** -0.0878*** -0.0028* 
 (0.00114) (0.00143) (0.199) (0.00190) (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0015) 
Treated 
-0.00072 -0.00135 -0.00006 -0.00142 0.0478** 0.0474** -0.0011 
 (0.00165) (0.00190) (0.0005) (0.00267) (0.01999) (0.0200) (0.0021) 
Observations 1,222,103 97,660 97,167 55,800 4,029 4,029 78,467 
R-squared 0.173 0.177 -- 0.271 0.017 0.030 0.165 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual FE YES YES NO YES NO NO YES 
Age FE YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Individual time-
varying controls YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Period 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual started a company that year.  Estimates are 
the linear probability model, except in column (3) which computes Logit, marginal effects. Column (1) restricts 
sample to Norwegian workers with at least a master’s degree.  All other specification restrict sample to Norwegian 
workers with a least a Ph.D.  The individual time-varying controls include lagged marital status, lagged total years 
of education dummies, log income, and log wealth.  Propensity score matching predicts treatment status (university 
employment) using age fixed effects, detailed Ph.D. type fixed effects, gender, and marital status.  Standard errors, 
in parentheses, are clustered by individual (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
Table 5: Startups, Individual Level, Intensive Margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pre-Period University Researchers Stayers 
 All Ph.D. Ph.D., Logit All Ph.D. Ph.D., Logit 
       
Treated x Post -0.00495*** -0.00302* -0.00240*** -0.00502*** -0.00305* -0.00248*** 
 (0.00130) (0.00165) (0.000616) (0.00138) (0.00173) (0.000625) 
Treated -- -- 0.000134 -- -- 0.000134 
   (0.000722)   (0.000722) 
Observations 16,523,512 66,310 63,161 16,521,472 64,270 63,996 
R-squared 0.153 0.159 -- 0.153 0.159 -- 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual FE YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Age FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual time-
varying controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual started a company that year.  Estimates are 
the linear probability model, except in columns (3) and (6), which report marginal effects from logit regressions. 
The control group is all Norwegian workers in columns (1) and (4) and non-university PhDs in other columns. 
Individual time-varying controls include lagged marital status, lagged total years of education dummies, log income, 
and log wealth. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 6A:  Start-up Performance at Year 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Survive  Log Sales Log Employees 
Log 
Assets Survive  Log Sales 
Log 
Employees 
Log 
Assets 
 
    
 
   
Treated x Post -0.1510* -0.9366** -0.0337 -0.5341 -0.0820 -0.7436 0.0827 -0.4037 
 (0.0868) (0.4489) (0.1274) (0.3557) (0.1047) (0.5574) (0.1449) (0.4045) 
Treated 0.0326 -0.4647 -0.2682*** 0.0758 -0.0102 -0.0461 -0.2011* 0.2476 
 (0.0547) (0.2916) (0.0878) (0.1962) (0.0689) (0.3828) (0.1025) (0.2572) 
Observations 48,972 36,172 44,277 36,199 580 485 543 485 
R-squared 0.0419 0.1441 0.0914 0.0437 0.317 0.1657 0.1378 0.1327 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-digit sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Sample Norway Norway Norway Norway Non-Uni 
PhD 
Non-Uni 
PhD 
Non-Uni 
PhD 
Non-Uni 
PhD 
Notes:  Dependent variables are indicated at top of each column and indicate performance at year 5 after the 
founding year.  Firms all founded 2000-2007, and performance data is then 2005-2012.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
 
Table 6B:  Probability of Achieving 75th Percentile Performance at Year 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sales Employees Assets Sales Employees Assets 
 
      
Treated x Post -0.1198** 0.0170 -0.1303* -0.1091* 0.0155 -0.0695 
 
(0.0490) (0.0536) (0.0757) (0.0628) (0.0663) (0.0933) 
Treated -0.0262 -0.1032*** 0.0810 0.0169 -0.0418 0.0507 
 
(0.0452) (0.0373) (0.0550) (0.0547) (0.0484) (0.0684) 
Observations 48,972 48,972 48,972 580 580 580 
R-squared 0.0591 0.0585 0.0283 0.1197 0.1036 0.0813 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-digit sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Sample Norway Norway Norway Non-Uni PhD Non-Uni PhD Non-Uni PhD 
Notes:  Dependent variables are binary indicators for achieving at least the 75th percentile of performance in the 
indicated measure, where the 75th percentile is defined for Norwegian startups as a whole.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).   
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Table 6C:  Start-up Sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log Startups Log Startups Log Startups Log Startups 
     
Treated x Post -0.727** -0.277 -1.239*** -1.245* 
 (0.322) (0.391) (0.352) (0.632) 
Treated -4.046*** -0.484* -3.201*** 0.520 
 (0.263) (0.243) (0.265) (0.434) 
Post -0.252* -0.701** -0.0305 -0.0240 
 (0.117) (0.251) (0.0809) (0.531) 
Observations 16 16 16 16 
R-squared 0.987 0.673 0.978 0.386 
Control Sample Norwegian 
Workforce 
PhD 
workforce 
Norwegian 
Workforce 
PhD 
workforce 
Startup Type Higher  
Tech  
Higher  
Tech 
Higher Tech, 
No ICT 
Higher Tech, 
No ICT 
Notes:  Dependent variables are log of start-up counts for the indicated startup-type in the last row of table.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 7:  Patents, Annual Rates, Aggregate and Technology Level Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Aggregate Technology 
 Log 
Patents 
Log 
Patents 
Log Patents 
per Worker 
Log Inventors 
per Worker 
Log  
Patents Patents 
       
Treated x Post 
-0.228* -0.228** -0.647*** -0.728*** -0.257* -0.242*** 
 (0.131) (0.089) (0.111) (0.208) (0.137) (0.057) 
Treated 
-2.089*** -2.089*** 4.499*** 7.614*** -2.060*** -2.064*** 
 (0.110) (0.073) (0.063) (0.099) (0.103) (0.173) 
Post 
-0.066 -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.054)      
Application 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Tech Class FE -- -- -- -- YES YES 
Control  
Sample 
Non 
University 
Inventors 
Non 
University 
Inventors 
Non 
University 
Inventors 
Non 
University 
Inventors 
Non 
University 
Inventors 
Non 
University 
Inventors 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson 
Observations 32 32 32 32 236 256 
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 -- 
Period 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 
Notes: In columns (1)-(4), observations consider aggregate patent counts for the treatment and control groups, by 
year. In columns (1)-(2) we consider log annual patent counts, while columns (3)-(4) consider log counts per 
worker, where worker count is the Norwegian workforce for the control sample and worker count is the university 
researcher workforce for the treatment sample. In columns (5)-(6), observations are technology class x year for the 
treatment and control groups, with technology class determined by the 1-digit IPC code.  Model is Poisson for count 
data, which allows incorporation of zero counts.   Robust standard errors in parentheses, except column (6) which 
clusters standard errors by technology class (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
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Table 8:  Patents, Individual Level, Inventors 
 Dependent variable:  Indicator for patenting in given year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Inventors All Inventors All Inventors Rare Names 
Treated x Post -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
Treated 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.040** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) 
Post -0.006*** -- -- 0.017*** 
 (0.002)    
Application Year FE NO YES YES YES 
Individual FE NO NO YES YES 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs 109,184 109,184 109,184 75,008 
Period 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 
  Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual patented at least once that year.  Estimates 
are the linear probability model.  Standard errors clustered by individual (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
 
Table 9:  Patents, Individual Level, Intensive Margin 
 Dependent variable:  Indicator for patenting in given year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-Period University Researchers Stayers 
Treated x Post -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.046*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Treated 0.047*** -- 0.049*** -- 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  
Post -0.005** -- -0.005** -- 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
Application Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Individual FE NO YES NO YES 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs 105,840 105,840 104,928 102,864 
Period 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 
Notes: Following Table 5, in columns (1) and (2) the treated sample includes university researchers employed at the 
university from 2000-2002, regardless of whether they remain at university after the reform.  In columns (3) and (4), 
the treated sample contains researchers who are at the university throughout the 2000-2007 period.  Results are 
similar using the full sample period (2000-2015) to define these “stayers”.  In all cases, the control sample is 
inventors who were never employed at university throughout the sample period.  Standard errors clustered by 
individual (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 10:  Patents, Citations Received 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Citation 
Count 
Citation 
Count 
Citation 
Count 
75th 
percentile 
patent 
90th 
percentile 
patent 
99th 
percentile 
patent 
Treated x Post -0.250* -0.292** -2.245** -0.474*** -0.386* -1.574* 
 (0.152) (0.149) (0.900) (0.178) (0.231) (0.810) 
Treated 0.341*** 0.348*** 2.516*** 0.527*** 0.533*** 1.022*** 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.827) (0.107) (0.144) (0.355) 
Application 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regression 
Model Poisson 
Negative 
binomial OLS Logit Logit Logit 
R2 -- -- 0.04 -- -- -- 
Obs 7,162 7,162 7,162 6,831 7,162 7,162 
Notes:  In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is the count of citations received by each patent.  Columns (4)-(6) 
examine the propensity to produce unusually highly-cited patents.  The dependent variable in these columns is an indicator 
equal to 1 if the patent receives citations at or above the indicated threshold.   Robust standard errors in parentheses (* 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Appendix I: A Simple Formalization 
Numerous countries maintain systems where the university, not the researcher, receives the 
majority of commercialization income.  To sharpen the ideas behind these policies (which 
includes Norway after the professor’s privilege reform and the U.S. after the Bayh-Dole Act), we 
introduce a simple formalization in the spirit of Holmstrom (1982).  Namely, consider a 
policymaker that seeks to encourage the flow of commercially-valuable innovations from 
universities.  This policy must balance the incentives of individual researchers with that of the 
university itself, which may make complementary investments that support successful 
technology commercialization.  The policymaker’s lever is rules on the allocation of rights 
assigned to each party. 
To fix ideas, let a researcher have a unit of time of which a share 	 is devoted to producing a 
commercially-valuable innovation and the remainder 1 − 	 is used for other tasks (like basic 
research, teaching, or leisure).  The university can also make investments (e.g., through a TTO) 
that facilitate the discovery and commercialization of technologies. By making an investment , 
the university improves the commercial success of a researcher's insight. 
Let the expected value of innovations that result be 	, !, which is increasing and concave in 
both arguments and where the inputs are complements ( ≥ 0).  The policy parameter is the 
portion 	that accrues to the individual researcher, leaving a portion 1 −  for the university.  As 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Scotchmer (2004) have emphasized in innovation contexts, giving 
all the rights to one party can make the first-best difficult to achieve given the desire to 
incentivize investment by both parties, and as Holmstrom (1982) emphasized broadly, there can 
be deep challenges in achieving first-best outcomes via the rent-sharing parameter . 
In particular, given a researcher investing 	 in commercialization activities, the university solves 
the problem 
 $ = %&'(1 − !	, ! − )     (A1) 
where the cost per unit of investment is .  The university's investment level is thus sensitive to 
their expected share of income, 1 − .   
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Meanwhile, let the individual researcher have quasi-linear preferences in income so that, for a 
given , the researcher solves the problem 
  	̂ = %&+(	, ! + , − -	)     (A2) 
The researcher earns 	, ! + ,, where , represents the individual's academic salary or other 
non-commercialization income.52  The disutility of commercialization effort (i.e. the loss of time 
for basic research, leisure, or other activities) is given by -	.53 
With this simple approach, we can now examine the Nash equilibrium that emerges where the 
researcher and university make their choices, 	̂ and $, as above, given the policy environment .  
A key observation is that, with complementarities between university and researcher 
investments, innovative output may not be maximized at  = 1, i.e. with a “professor’s 
privilege”.54 Moreover, taking some rent share from one party may not only create more 
innovation but also encourage the party with the declining rent share to exert more effort.   
To understand the role of such complementarities, consider a standard labor supply diagram for 
the researcher (see Figure A.1) and consider how the researcher’s budget constraint rotates in the 
presence of changes in the researcher’s rent share.  In a normal labor supply problem, increasing 
the tax rate on earned income will rotate the budget constraint counter-clockwise around the 
point C.  This rotation generally creates two effects:  the substitution effect will dissuade effort at 
the task, while the income effect pushes the other way, leading to the standard theoretical 
ambiguity linking tax rates and labor effort.  Here, however, we have turned off income effects 
given the quasi-linear preferences of (A2), so the substitution effect will determine the worker’s 
response.  Nonetheless, the presence of complementarities in investment makes the direction of 
the rotation itself ambiguous.  The slope of the budget set at an interior solution is 	̂, $! (see 
point B in Figure A.1). Since the equilibrium investment of the university is a function of , i.e., 
$!, there is both a direct effect of reducing the researcher share, rotating the budget line 
                                                           
52
 For simplicity and to focus on the issue of complementarity, we take quasi-linear preferences, which turn off 
income effects and also remove considerations of risk aversion. 
53
 For simplicity, we will consider the model taking -	as fixed, although more generally this could be considered as a 
taste parameter drawn from a distribution .-!.  Thus, in general, some fraction of researchers may participate in 
commercialization activities while others may not. 
54
 For example, this result appears directly for a Cobb-Douglas production function or more generally where each 
input is necessary to positive production (	, 0! = 0, ! = 0).  In such cases, either  = 1 or  = 0 would not 
produce positive commercialization output, as one party would not invest. 
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counterclockwise (like a standard tax), and an indirect effect, via changes in the university 
investment, that can rotate the budget line clockwise (via complementary investment).  Formally, 
Lemma.  /	0ℎ	23	
&3
	2		230	23%	23		24	3	35	24		̂, $! +
	̂, $!$6! > 0.		9, 4	
ℎ	:4		6		:225%, $6! ≤ 0	
	 = 1.	 
Proof. By the first order condition for the university researcher, 	̂ is chosen such that 
	̂, ! = -.  Totally differentiating this condition with respect to  we have 
	̂′! =
	̂, $! + 	̂, $!$6!

 
Noting that  < 0, it follows that 	̂6! > 0 iff 	̂, $! + 	̂, $!$6! > 0.  Hence the 
first part of the Lemma. From the maximization problem for the university (see (1)), it follows 
by inspection that $ = 0 at  = 1.  Thus, $ must be weakly larger for  < 1.  Therefore 
$6! ≤ 0	
	 = 1. 
The first term in the Lemma, , represents the “tax effect” from , while the second term, 
$6!, captures the “complementarity effect” from , operating through the university’s 
investment decision.  By inspection, in the absence of complementarities ( = 0), researcher 
investment increases in the researcher’s rent share.55  However, in the presence of 
complementarities ( > 0), and where the university’s investment is increasing in the 
university’s rent share ($6! < 0), researcher effort may actually decline in the researcher’s rent 
share.  Indeed, starting with a “professor’s privilege” where the researcher has all rights to an 
innovation ( = 1), the university does not invest:  increasing the rent share to the university can 
then  encourage greater university investment, and this in turn may encourage more 
(complementary) investment by the researcher -- even as the researcher’s share of the pie is 
declining. 
An Example that Can Motivate the Reform 
A simple example can further illustrate the potentially non-monotonic relationship between a 
party’s rent share and their equilibrium effort level.  In particular, consider a CES production 
function 
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 Recall again that we are turning off income effects, for focus. If preferences were not linear in income, then taxing 
a researcher more could alternatively encourage more effort via a sufficiently strong income effect. 
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	, ! = (>+	? + >'?)@/?      (A3) 
with returns-to-scale parameter B and elasticity of substitution C = 
D?
.  Equilibrium investment 
levels and innovative income are shown in Figure A.2 as a function of the policy  for 
illustrative parameters.56  We see that both researcher and university investments increase as one 
initially moves away from the professor’s privilege.  Indeed, this example is constructed to show 
a case where net innovation income from university-based researchers peaks at  ≈ 1/3.  Thus, 
emphasizing complementarities in investment may provide a natural logic for reforming the 
“professor’s privilege” in the vein of several European countries – and the similar balance 
between researcher and university rent shares often found in the United States today. 
Of course, given that the empirical findings show a decline in the quantity and quality of both 
start-up activity and patenting, the candidate theoretical example in Figure A.2 appears rejected 
by the data.  Alternative examples in the income rights framework that match the findings are 
similarly easy to construct.  For example, while the example in Figure A.2 assumed that the 
productivity of the researcher and the university are equivalent (>+ = >'), an alternative where 
the researcher’s role is substantially more important (>+ ≫ >') and the inputs are gross 
substitutes can push the commercialization peak to the corner solution where the professor is 
given full rights, as in the pre-reform regime. 
Application to Tax Rates 
This income rights framework can also generate an implication for the effect of taxation.  
Namely, the decline in  can be thought of in part as increasing the tax rate on researcher’s 
commercialization income.  The policy change (lowering ) acts both as a tax on researcher 
income and an incentive for complementary investments by the university which may, ceteris 
paribus, raise the return to the researcher’s investment.  The additional effect on university 
investment distinguishes the experiment from a narrower tax experiment on the university 
researcher’s commercialization income.  However, under the conditions of the model, the shift in 
 provides a lower bound on the effect of an equivalent tax.   
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 Namely, for this illustration we set >+ = >' = 1 so that the inventor and university are equally productive in their 
investments;  B = 0.5 so that there is decreasing returns to scale; - = 1 and  = 0.1 so that the costs of investment 
are higher for the individual than the university; and I = 1/3 so that the inputs are complements but neither input is 
necessary for positive output. 
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To see this application formally, define a tax rate on earned income, 1 − J, so that a researcher’s 
after tax income is    
  = J	, ! + ,!        (A4) 
Write the equilibrium commercialization effort of the individual researcher as 	̂, J!.  Now 
compare two policy regimes, a tax regime where , J! 	= 	 1, 0! and a rent-sharing regime 
where , J! 	= 	 0, 1!, so that the tax rate and rent-sharing rate are of equivalent size. 
Lemma. 	̂1, J! ≤ 	̂, 1! for  = J. 
Proof.  By the first order condition for the university researcher, 	̂ is chosen such that 
J	̂, ! = -.  The first order condition for the “tax” case where , J! 	= 	 1, 0!  is then 
0K	̂1, 0!, 1, 0!L = -.  The first order condition for the “property rights allocation” case 
where , J! 	= 	 0, 1!  is then 0K	̂0, 1!, 0, 1!L = -.  It therefore follows that  
 K	̂1, 0!, 1, 0!L = K	̂0, 1!, 0, 1!L.        (A5) 
Now note that 0, 1! ≥ 1, 0! = 0, since the university does not invest when it has no rights 
(see (A1)).  Therefore, with  ≥ 0 (i.e. maintaining the assumption that investments are 
complements), (A5) can only hold if 	̂1, 0! ≤ 	̂0, 1!.	 Hence the Lemma. 
Based on this reasoning, university researchers appear very sensitive to the effective tax rates on 
their expected income.  Noting that  in the policy experiment is increased by two-thirds and that 
the ensuing decline in start-up and patenting rates is approximately one-half to two-thirds, the 
implied elasticity to an equivalent tax rate J has a lower bound of 0.75. 
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Appendix II: Analysis of Publications 
The end of the professor’s privilege may separately affect university researchers’ publication 
behavior.  To the extent that marketplace innovation becomes less appealing, the individual 
university researcher may shift effort toward other activities, including basic research, teaching, 
or leisure.  The university commercialization literature has been concerned particularly with the 
balance between commercialization effort and research effort, noting potential welfare tradeoffs 
should patenting or start-up behavior come at the expense of basic research (e.g., National 
Academy of Sciences 2010). 
To inform this issue, we collected all Web of Science (WOS) publications with at least one 
Norwegian address and then matched this data, based on author name, to the NIFU database of 
university researchers.  This approach allows us to integrate publication data and patent data for 
the university researchers.  Further, the NIFU database incorporates demographic information 
about university researchers, including doctoral field, PhD cohort, age, and gender among other 
observables.57 
In assessing potential tradeoffs between commercialization and research activities, a central 
question is whether these activities are substitutes or complements.  On the one hand, viewed 
from the perspective of a budget constraint (in time and/or money) effort at one task may seem to 
detract inevitably from the other.  However, to the extent that the researcher substitutes 
commercialization activity against leisure or other non-research activities, commercialization 
activity need not come at the expense of basic research.  On the other hand, viewed from the 
perspective of the knowledge production function, innovative and basic research activities may 
be complements.  For example, effort in creating patentable inventions may spark an individual’s 
research insights, which in turn increases an individual’s publication output (e.g., Stokes 1997, 
Azoulay et al. 2009).   
 
                                                           
57
 The WOS provides an author’s last name and first initial only. Given the potential increased matching noise with 
the limited information on first name, the analysis below focuses on the sample of individuals with low frequency 
names in Norway.  These are individuals for whom the full name (from the NIFU data) appears three or less times in 
Norway as a whole.  In practice, this drops 20% of the matched sample. In any case, using the full sample shows 
similar results. 
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To shed light on these issues, we first analyze whether university researchers who patent 
(“university inventors”) tend to publish more or less than university researchers who do not 
patent.  We find strong evidence that university inventors tend to publish substantially more 
papers and also more highly-cited papers.  Table A.1 column 1 shows that university inventors 
average an additional 0.67 journal publications per year.  Given an average publication rate of 
1.08 publications per year for university researchers, the publication rate of the inventors appears 
about 60% greater.  Column 2 shows that the publication advantage of university inventors is 
robust to controlling for year, PhD cohort, university, and doctoral field fixed effects, as well as 
gender.  The robustness to doctoral field fixed effects shows that the heightened publication 
activity of university inventors is not due to the differences between, say, material science and 
economics, but rather appears within the same field.  Columns 3 and 4 reconsider publication 
volume counting “fractional publications”, where an author receives 1/N credit for a paper, 
where N is the number of authors.  The increased publication rate of university inventors is 
robust to this alternative accounting.  Columns 5 and 6 consider mean citations received per 
publication and show that the average citation impact of university inventors’ papers is 
substantially higher than the citation impact for other university researchers.  Collectively, these 
findings suggest that university inventors are especially productive researchers, producing both 
more papers and more highly-cited papers than their non-patenting counterparts.  This finding 
appears both across and within fields. 
The greater publication output of university inventors may suggest that patenting and publication 
activities are complements in production (e.g., Fabrizio and Di Minin 2008, Azoulay et al. 2009, 
Buenstorf 2009).  However, the positive correlations in Table A.1 may also be driven by an 
individual-level effect, where some researchers are simply more productive at both tasks.  Then 
patenting and publications may still be substitutes within a given individual.   The question of 
whether patents and publications are complements or substitutes at the individual level is thus 
unclear – and remains an important question for assessing potential tradeoffs with basic research 
that may emerge from university commercialization policies. 
The professor’s privilege reform provides an opportunity to further investigate this issue by 
looking at how the publications within individuals respond when the incentives to patent 
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change.58  We again take a differences-in-difference approach, but face a limitation.  Namely, 
publications outside universities are rare in Norway, which makes control groups outside the 
university context (and hence unaffected by the reform) difficult to find.59  Nonetheless, we may 
proceed on a different tack, noting that patenting is sequestered within a relatively small number 
of disciplines within universities so that a change in patent incentives may naturally affect some 
university researchers far more than others.  A regression approach can then study publications 
by asking whether a treated group, for whom patenting matters relatively strongly, changes their 
publication output compared to other university researchers, who would presumably be less 
affected by the reform.   
We consider two types of analyses along these lines.  First, organizing the 35 different PhD 
disciplines in the Norwegian data, we find 15 disciplines for which university researchers never 
patent between 1995 and 2010.  By contrast, in the top 5 PhD disciplines by patent propensity, 
university researchers produce patents in 1.2% of researcher-years.  Table A.2 considers 
regressions that compare individual researchers in the top 5 patenting PhD disciplines (the 
treated group) with those in PhD disciplines where patenting has not occurred (the control 
group).  The regressions include individual fixed effects which allow us to focus on within 
individual changes.  In column 1, we first consider the tendency to patent.  In line with the 
analysis in Section IV.B, patenting rates declines after the reform for individuals in the patent-
heavy disciplines.  The following columns investigate publication measures.  The findings 
indicate that individual university researchers in patent-heavy fields do not measurably change 
their publication rates after the reform compared to university researchers in patent-free fields.  
The potential exception is that average citation impact appears to decline within individual 
researchers in patent-heavy fields, after the reform.  The statistical significance of this finding is, 
however, not robust to other reasonable specifications along these lines, including those below. 
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 Note that this analysis examines the interplay of patenting and publications; entrepreneurship may show a 
different relationship with research output.  Recall that we cannot link publications to the university entrepreneurs, 
because the entrepreneurship analysis uses anonymized personal identifiers in Norwegian registry datasets (i.e., we 
do not know the entrepreneurs’ names). 
59
 .  In particular, examining WOS publications with Norwegian authors that do not match to university researcher 
names, we see that these authors only publish once in ten years, on average, which is also about one-tenth the 
publication rate for university researchers.  It is thus difficult to find a relevant non-university control group for 
publications in Norway. 
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A possible difficulty with the analysis in Table A.2 is that, even in patent-heavy fields, most 
researchers do not patent.  Therefore, any publication effects on “patent-sensitive” researchers 
may go undetected by mixing them together with those who have no intention to patent.  An 
alternative approach then is to focus explicitly on university researchers with a demonstrated 
interest in patenting; i.e., individuals who patented before the reform.  We can then ask whether 
these specific university inventors, upon the reform, changed their publication behavior.  Table 
A.3 considers this analysis.  In columns 1-4, the control group is all other university researchers.  
In columns 5-8, the control group is constructed from the two nearest neighbors for each pre-
reform university inventor, where the nearest neighbors share the same PhD discipline as the 
university inventor and have the closest average number of publications per year in the pre-
period.  Columns 1 and 5 consider patenting to confirm that the patenting behavior of these 
individual inventors drops substantially after the reform. The remaining columns, which consider 
publication measures as indicated in the table, show no statistically significant changes.  If 
anything, the coefficients tend to be negative, suggesting that publications of university inventors 
may have relatively declined.   
Together, these analyses show no indication that an increase in publications acted as a kind of 
“silver lining”, offsetting the decline in university-based innovation detailed in main text.  On 
net, the publications do not appear clearly as either complements or substitutes for more applied 
innovative activities. A tradeoff between inventive activity and publication activity does not 
visibly emerge at the individual level, which calls into question the concern that university 
commercialization activity comes at the expense of basic research.   
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Figure A.1:  Researcher Utility Maximization and Effort at Commercial Innovation 
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Figure A.2:  Investment and Innovation as Function of Researcher Rent Share (α) 
CES Example 
 
 
Notes:  Example is CES (see equation (A3)).  Parameters are >+ = >' = 1,  B = 0.5, - = 1, = 0.1, and I = 1/3. 
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Table A.1:  The Publication Output of University Inventors 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Publications Publications Fractional Publications  
Fractional 
Publications  
Mean 
Citations 
Mean 
Citations 
University Inventor 0.668*** 0.487*** 0.177*** 0.131*** 3.317*** 1.945** 
 (0.188) (0.185) (0.051) (0.051) (0.976) (0.979) 
Doctoral Field FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
PhD Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
University FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Gender No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.04 
Obs 49,640 49,640 49,640 49,640 49,640 49,640 
Notes: Regressions are OLS.  Observations are individual name by year.  The sample mean of the dependent 
variables are 1.08 (publications), 0.30 (fractional publications), and 6.06 (mean citations). Doctoral field fixed 
effects account for differences between 35 different fields.  The sample is limited to university researchers with rare 
names, though using entire sample produces similar results.  Standard errors clustered by individual (* p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
 
 
Table A.2:  The Change in Publication Output within Individuals - 
Patent-Heavy vs. Patent-Free Research Disciplines 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patents Publications Fractional Publications 
Mean 
Citations 
Patent-Heavy x Post -0.006** 0.025 -0.034 -1.971*** 
 (0.003) (0.107) (0.024) (0.657) 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.25 0.00 0.64 0.00 
Obs 17,329 17,329 17,329 17,329 
Notes:  Regressions are OLS.  The patent-heavy and post terms are absorbed by the individual and year fixed 
effects, respectively.  Patent-heavy fields are the top 5 (of 35) PhD disciplines by patent propensity on a per-person 
and per-year basis.  Patent-free fields are the 15 (of 35) PhD disciplines with zero patents by university researchers 
from 1995-2010.  Observations are individual name by year.  The sample is limited to university researchers with 
rare names, though using the entire sample produces similar results.  Standard errors clustered by individual (* 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table A.3:  The Change in Publication Output within Individuals - 
University Inventors vs. Non-Inventors 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Control Group:  All Other University Researchers Control Group:  Nearest Neighbors 
 Patents Publications Fractional Publications 
Mean 
Citations Patents Publications 
Fractional 
Publications 
Mean 
Citations 
Inventor  -0.120*** -0.122 -0.073 -1.774 -0.123*** -0.177 -0.050 0.583 
      x Post (0.018) (0.194) (0.057) (1.414) (0.018) (0.275) (0.073) (1.982) 
Indiv FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.26 0.75 0.64 0.32 0.23 0.77 0.61 0.35 
Obs 49,640 49,640 49,640 49,640 3,694 3,694 3,694 3,694 
Notes:  Regressions are OLS.  The inventor and post terms are absorbed by the individual and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  Inventors are those university researchers who patented prior to the reform.  In columns (1)-(4) the 
control group is all other university researchers.  In columns (5)-(8) the control group are the two nearest neighbors 
to the inventor based on pre-reform publication rates, conditional on being in the same PhD field.  Observations are 
individual name by year.  The sample is limited to university researchers with rare names, though using the entire 
sample produces similar results. Standard errors clustered by individual (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
 
 
 
 
 
